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I. INTRODUCTION
During 1995, the Supreme Court in Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton,1 addressed whether drug-testing of interscholastic athletes
was constitutional. A mere six years later, the Supreme Court has
again agreed to review the appeal in Earls v. Board of Education,2 as
to whether drug-testing of students involved in any extracurricular
activities, including athletes, is constitutional. This Article will
showcase the path leading to the Vernonia decision and its
aftermath.
The destructive wake left by the improper and illegal drug use
in this country is a national tragedy. During the 1980's, active and
retired professional and Olympic-caliber athletes were repeatedly
covered in the news, not for their sports accomplishments, but their
problems with drugs and alcohol. Seeking to preserve the integrity
of professional athletic activities and those governed by the United
States Olympic Committee, comprehensive drug-testing policies for
these elite athletes were put into place during this decade. Concur-
rently, the 1980's saw the emergence of the use and abuse of non-
prescription drugs, such as performance-enhancing or recreational
drugs, by student-athletes. Responding to this problem and operat-
ing from laudable concerns to stem the use of drugs having the
potential of creating devastating effects on the health, safety and
welfare of students, and while recognizing the high profile nature
of their interscholastic and intercollegiate athletes, administrators
across the country introduced consent forms requiring students
seeking participation in extracurricular athletic activities to submit
to random drug-testing through urinalysis for certain drugs or per-
formance-enhancing methods.
The reasons behind academic drug-testing are: (1) maintain-
ing the health and safety of the student-athlete; (2) maintaining the
health and safety of other athletes; (3) maintaining fair play and
integrity of the academic institution, conference or athletic associa-
tion; and (4) maintaining the public's trust. The mechanics for ac-
ademic drug-testing include: (a) what triggers the right to conduct
drug-testing, specifically, whether the right to conduct such testing
1. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
2. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, sub nora. Bd. of Educ. of Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 509 (Nov. 8, 2001) (oral argument scheduled
for March 19, 2002).
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is based on individual suspicion versus random suspicionless test-
ing, which may be done at announced or unannounced times; (b)
the testing procedure and procedural safeguards; (c) maintaining
the chain of custody of the sample; (d) the due process elements of
notice and opportunity to be heard;3 (e) confidentiality aspects;
and (f) the severity of the penalty which can be featured in escalat-
ing order: athletic sanctions, academic sanctions, or criminal
sanctions.4
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
hibits unreasonable searches and seizures.5 It provides: "The right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 6 In the
drug-testing paradigm, urine collection and testing constitute a
3. For additional information regarding the due process element, see infra
note 4.
4. The severity of the sanction would also influence the level of procedural
due process required. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution man-
dates in part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates substantive
and procedural due process. See id. Procedural due process concerns whether
notice and hearing must be conducted by the government official before the im-
position of an action. See id. The sanctions imposed by the educational institu-
tions generally concern only athletic eligibility. The courts have consistently found
that there is no Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to participate in inter-
scholastic or intercollegiate athletics. See, e.g., Palmer v. Merluzzi, 689 F. Supp.
400, 412, 415 (D.N.J. 1988) (rejecting Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
and due process arguments by student-athlete whose athletic suspension was elon-
gated after initial ten-day athletic suspension was imposed, and where the student
admitted violating school's anti-drug and alcohol policy); Diane Heckman, Women
& Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MitAi ENT. & SPORTS L. REv.
1, nn.115-24 (1992) (listing cases that discuss Fourteenth Amendment's right to
participate in intercollegiate activities). But see Dennin v. Conn. Interscholastic
Athletic Conf., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 663, 671 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding interscholas-
tic athletics participation was included within individualized educational plan man-
dated by Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(20), which
district court held raised it to federally protected right), vacated as moot, 94 F.3d
633 (lst Cir. 1996).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment has been deemed to
apply to state actors pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
6. Id.
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search. 7 Thus, the underlying issue presented is the constitutional-
ity of the random acquisition and analysis of a urine sample, not
authorized by warrant, probable cause or individualized suspicion.
Ultimately, the key determination is whether the search was
reasonable.
A party, seeking to challenge the drug test, would assert a sec-
tion 1983 action, 8 alleging there was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment and possible transgression of Fourteenth Amendment
due process protections. 9 In order to proceed, an aggrieved party
must establish that a governmental entity, also known as a state ac-
tor, is involved. In relation to interscholastic athletes, some circuit
courts have held that a "local government entity, such as a school
district, may be held liable under section 1983 for constitutional
violations committed pursuant to a governmental policy or cus-
tom."10 State high school athletic associations may also be deemed
state actors.1 1  On the interscholastic level, it is not customary for
the state high school athletic association to require random drug-
testing, as the school districts on their own volition have mandated
such policies. There is no case law exploring the constitutionality
of a drug-testing policy implemented by a state interscholastic ath-
letic association.
On the intercollegiate level, however, the drug-testing policy of
the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") regulates
student-athletes with the individual member universities or colleges
merely being the conduits. 12 The Supreme Court held in NCAA v.
Tarkanian13 that the NCAA was not a state actor and, therefore, not
7. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (citing Skin-
ner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989), which assessed that
state-compelled collection and testing of urine constituted Fourth Amendment
search).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). The law, known as the Civil Action for Depriva-
tion of Rights, states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or the proper
proceeding for redress.
Id.
9. See id.
10. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 2000).
11. See generally Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531
U.S. 288 (2001).
12. The present NCAA policy is presented in the NCAA DRUG-TESTING PRO-
GRAM 2001-02, which is revised annually.
13. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
[Vol. 9: p. 209
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required to provide Fourteenth Amendment due process to the
men's basketball coach employed by a state university, the Univer-
sity of Nevada at Las Vegas. 14 This decision has presently shielded
the NCAA's drug-testing paradigm from Fourth Amendment entan-
glement. In O'Halloran v. University of Washington,'5 student-athletes
challenged the constitutionality of the then NCAA drug-testing pro-
gram based on violating the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.16 The district court determined that the NCAA was not
engaging in state action. 17 What is interesting is that this case did
not even produce a substantive federal circuit court of appeals deci-
sion.18 And yet, this decision has been the linchpin for eschewing
state involvement to envelop federal Fourth Amendment protec-
tion over the NCAA.19 Colleges and universities, therefore, may
also have their own institutional programs. 20
Moreover, when an individual seeks to sue a state entity or state
actor, the issue of sovereign or governmental immunity may come
14. See id. at 199.
15. 679 F. Supp. 997, 997-999 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (student-athletes unsuccess-
fully sued their state university challenging that the university's utilization of the
NCAA drug-testing policy violated the Fourth Amendment), rev'd and remanded,
856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988) (on procedural grounds), dismissed, No. 97-2-08775-
1, sub. 65 (Kings Co. Super Cot. 1989).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 1002-03.
18. See O'Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F. 2d 1375, 1381 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
(reversing on procedural grounds).
19. See Barbay v. NCAA, No. 86-5697, 1987 WL 5619, at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 20,
1987) (football player unsuccessfully challenged NCAA test as violating his consti-
tutional liberty interests where failed drug test resulted in his prohibition from
bowl game and thus inability of National Football League scouts to see his play).
See generally Hill v. NCAA, 273 Cal. Rptr. 402, review granted by 801 P.2d 1070 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990), rev'd, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (student-athletes and Stanford Uni-
versity unsuccessfully challenged NCAA drug-testing policy in state court as violat-
ing California Constitution, CAL. CONST. ART. 1, §1, section protecting privacy
concerns); Brennan v. Bd. of Trs. of La. Sys., 691 So. 2d 324 (La. Ct. App. 1997)
(football player at Southwest Louisiana University unsuccessfully challenged actual
NCAA drug test results as being flawed and that policy violated Louisiana state
constitution); Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989) (cross-coun-
try runner and member of the indoor and outdoor track team at this private uni-
versity unsuccessfully challenged NCAA drug-testing program pursuant to
Massachusetts state laws governing privacy and civil rights).
20. See Univ. of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929, 967 (Colo. 1993) (en banc),
cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1070 (1994). University students successfully sued their uni-
versity in state court challenging the university's own drug-testing policy pursuant
to the Fourth Amendment and the Colorado Constitution, COLO. CONST. ART. II,
§ 7, which was based on "reasonable suspicion" which was defined to include ran-
dom rapid eye examinations. See Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 930, 934. A failed drug test
could result in a permanent athletic suspension. See id. at 931. The Colorado
Supreme Court found the consent provided by students was not voluntary. See id.
at 930.
5
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into play. Even assuming there is a valid basis for asserting a cause
of action against the state, the issue of qualified immunity for cer-
tain state employees, such as teachers, may arise. 21 Accordingly, to
establish a prima facie case the plaintiff must prove that: (1) the
entity engaged in state action that was not privileged; (2) a search
occurred; and (3) the search was not reasonable. The defendant
would then be required to prove that the search was reasonable in
order to meet the requirements of the Constitution.
Part II of this article introduces Fourth Amendment con-
cerns.22 Part III looks at drug-testing of educational employees to
juxtapose the issue as it concerns adults vis-A-vis minors.23 Part IV
discusses educational searches of students generally, while Part V
investigates the methods and substances tested.24 Part VI examines
drug-testing considerations involving students, while Part VII traces
initial drug-testing decisions involving student-athletes. 25 Part VIII
addresses the seminal Supreme Court decision in this area, Vernonia
School District 4 7J v. Acton,26 whereas Part IX reviews significant post-
Vernonia decisions, 27 and Part X presents the latest Supreme Court's
appeal in Earls v. Board of Education Tecumseh Public School.28
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The right to privacy is balanced against the reasons for and the
need for drug-testing of athletes. "The heart of the controversy...
is whether the particular test infringes on an expectation of privacy
that society considers reasonable." 29 The Supreme Court referred
to the essence of the Fourth Amendment, by stating that its "over-
riding function... is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State. °30 Sol Wachler, former Chief
21. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1962);Jenkins v. Tal-
ladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821 (11th Cir. 1997); B.C. v. Plumas Unified
Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding random suspicionless search
conducted by trained dog was unconstitutional).
22. See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
23. See infta notes 39-66 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 67-87 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
26. 515 U.S. 646 (1995); see infra notes 110-161 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 162-228 and accompanying text.
28. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, sub nom. Bd. of Educ. of In-
dep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 509 (Nov. 8, 2001) (oral argument sched-
uled for March 19, 2002); see infra notes 229-250 and accompanying text.
29. Patchogue-Medford Cong. of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 65
(1987) (finding privacy expectations of public employees required examination of
both Federal and State Constitutions).
30. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
[Vol. 9: p. 209
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Justice of the New York Court of Appeals, summarized this
problem:
The guarantee against unreasonable search and seizures
found in both the State and Federal Constitutions . . . is
designed to protect the personal privacy and dignity of the
individual against unwarranted intrusions by the State ....
It protects not only the individual's home and property
but also one's person and bodily integrity.3 1
The construct for examining the constitutionality of searches is a
three-step analysis. The first issue is whether a search and seizure
was conducted by a government entity or a private entity. The
courts have uniformly determined that the collection and testing of
urine constitutes a search and seizure.3 2 Blood tests would also be
considered a search and seizure. Initially, no American athletic
governing body used blood tests; however, the resistance is begin-
ning to waiver as concerns about the testing of Olympic athletes is
limited by urinalysis testing. The second issue is whether the offi-
cials involved have the authority to conduct the search pursuant to
the designated scheme. This issue, however, is generally contested.
The third issue is whether the search was reasonable depending
upon the type of search. "By restricting the government to reasona-
ble searches, the State and Federal Constitutions recognize that
there comes a point at which searches intended to serve the public
interest, however effective, may themselves undermine the public's
interest in maintaining the privacy, dignity and security of its
members."3 3
31. Patchogue-Medford, 70 N.Y.2d at 66 (identifying protection is primarily
aimed at limiting scope of criminal investigations by police, but it also places re-
strictions on conduct of government officials generally, including state employers
and school authorities).
32. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (holding urine tests
constitute search); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989)
(establishing urine collection as search and seizure); Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (citing Skinner decision on constitu-
tionality of urine testing); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309,
1313 (7th Cir. 1988) (determining urine testing constitutes search); O'Halloran v.
Univ. of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (holding NCAA's drug-
testing using urine collection as Fourth Amendment search); Patchogue-Medford, 70
N.Y.2d at 67 (recognizing although urine is waste product, "[tihe act of discharg-
ing urine is a private, indeed intimate, one and the product may contain revealing
information concerning an individual's personal life and habits for those capable
of analyzing it").
33. Patchogue-Medford, 70 N.Y.2d at 70 (concluding random searches con-
ducted by state without reasonable suspicion are closely scrutinized, and generally
only permitted when privacy interests implicated are minimal, government's inter-
7
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The Fourth Amendment, which requires that searches and
seizures be based upon probable cause, has dramatically evolved
and allows for five types of searches. These general types of
searches are:
1. voluntary consensual searches; 34
2. searches conducted pursuant to warrant;35
3. exceptions to warrant searches, or warrantless
searches; 36
4. authorized searches based upon reasonable suspicion
or individual suspicion;3 7 and
5. qualified limited systematic searches, which are
suspicionless.38
The searches fall into two general categories: "criminal" searches
(search types two and three) and "administrative" searches (search
types four and five), except for the first type, which may fall into
est is substantial, and safeguards are provided to insure that individual's reasona-
ble expectation of privacy is not subject to unregulated discretion).
34. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 198 (1990) (holding warrant-
less entry valid when based on consent of third party whom police believed to have
common authority). See generally Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
35. Reasonableness generally requires that the government have probable
cause and obtain a warrant before conducting a search and seizure. See e.g., United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1976) (discussing reasonableness of
searches).
36. Exceptions to warrant searches that have been judicially sanctioned in-
clude searches involving: consent, incident to arrest, plain view, exigent circum-
stances, inventory searches, and "stop and frisk" searches. See, e.g., Mich. St. Police
v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1994) (upholding constitutionality of suspicionless
searches at highway sobriety checkpoints); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
569-73 (1991) (discussing automobile searches); New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,
703-05 (1987) (approving search of premises of certain highly regulated busi-
nesses, which herein was automobile junkyard); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (upholding stopping motorists at fixed checkpoints
near country's southern border). See generally O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987) (discussing work-related searches of employees' desks and offices). But see
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 673 (1979) (upholding police check points to
stop drivers, however, Fourth Amendment prohibited random stops to check driv-
ers' licenses and motor vehicle registrations).
37. Authorization by a legislative enactment defines and limits official author-
ity. SeeActon v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514, 1520 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
Oregon Constitution, which sets limits on official searches and seizures).
38. "[T]he executive itself may provide limits by establishing a systematically
administered program pursuant to its statutory authority." Vernonia, 23 F.3d at
1520. See generally Dovovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (discussing ability of coal
mine inspectors to performs searches within "reasonable limits"); United States v.
Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (involving gun dealer); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (involving liquor dealer); LeRoy v. Ill. Racing
Bd., 39 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving administrative scheme allowing for war-
rantless searches upon demand on track grounds).
[Vol. 9: p. 209
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either category. "Criminal" searches are those, which may result in
criminal penalties, including prison sentences. "Administrative"
searches are those with an absence of criminal penalties. In gen-
eral, active elite or professional athletes are rarely subject to crimi-
nal trials or imprisonment.
III. TESTING OF EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYEES
The identity of the targeted class for random drug-testing
should be identified.39 To place this issue in context, this article
reviews drug-testing of general employees and drug-testing of
school employees. The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of
governmental administrative searches of employees in Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Assn.4a The Court ruled that the Federal
Railroad Administration's drug-testing, including blood and urine
tests, of railroad conductors involved in major train accidents, con-
stituted a reasonable search. 41 The Court also found "the expecta-
tions of privacy of covered employees are diminished by reason of
their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to en-
sure safety, a goal dependent in substantial part, on the health and
fitness of covered employees." 42 The Court introduced the "special
needs" exception to searches based on individual suspicion; this
concept runs throughout the judicial decisions. 43 The Court stated
39. See Charles A. Palmer, Drugs vs. Privacy: The New Game in Sports, 2 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 175, 187 (1992) (analyzing "targeted" class).
40. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Federal regulations containing "Mandatory Guide-
lines for Federal Workplace Drug-testing Programs" were introduced in April
1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 11978-89 (Apr. 11, 1988); see also Federal Omnibus Trans-
portation Employees Testing Act of 1991, 49 U.S.C. § 31306 (1994) (mandating,
inter alia, drug-testing of municipal employees with commercial drivers' licenses
operating vehicles which can reach thirty-five miles per hour, commencing in Jan-
uary 1996). The legislation was initiated in response to train accidents where con-
ductors were found to have marijuana in their systems. The regulations apply to
any employee who operates a "commercial vehicle" and who is required to have a
commercial driver's license. See Controlled Substances and Alcohol Use and Test-
ing, 49 C.F.R. § 382.103(a) (1) (2001) (indicating applicability of commercial
driver's license requirements).
41. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 634 (1989) (ex-
plaining it was reasonable search even though there was no requirement of war-
rant or reasonable suspicion that any particular employee might be impaired due
to compelling government interest served by regulations which outweighed em-
ployee's privacy concerns).
42. Id. at 627.
43. See id. at 624. The Court further elaborated:
We made it clear, however, that a showing of individualized suspicion is
not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unrea-
sonable. In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated
by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental inter-
est furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a require-
9
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it had "recognized exceptions to . . . [the warrant requirement]
when special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractica-
ble."'44 "[W] hen faced with such special needs, [it had] not hesi-
tated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess
the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in
a particular context."45 In contrast, Justice Marshall, author of the
dissent, argued that "because the need for action against the drug
scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional
excess is great. '" 4
6
On the same day it decided Skinner, the Supreme Court de-
cided National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,47 a five to four
decision, in which it upheld the United States Department of Cus-
toms' "drug-testing program of employees who play a direct role in
interdiction, [or] carry a firearm, .. .as a reasonable search be-
cause minimal intrusions on privacy [are] outweighed by govern-
ment's compelling interest in promoting safety and deterring
abuse." 48 Because urine tests are searches, these tests must satisfy
ment of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the
absence of such suspicion.
Id.
44. Id. at 619 (explicating that except in certain well-defined circumstances,
search or seizure in such case is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant
to judicial warrant issued upon probable cause).
45. Id. (listing cases that balance governmental and privacy interests dealing
with searches of homes, business premises, employees' desks and offices, students'
property carried out by school officials and body cavity searches of prison inmates)
(citations omitted).
46. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[I]ssue is not whether
declaring war on illegal drugs is good public policy .... Rather the issue here is
whether the Government's development in that war of a particularly Draconian
weapon - the compulsory collection and chemical testing of railroad workers'
blood and urine - comports with [the] Fourth Amendment.").
47. 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (exploring suit filed by railway labor organizations to
enjoin regulations promulgated by Federal Railroad Administration governing
drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees).
48. Id. at 679 (finding federal government has compelling interest in ensur-
ing that front-line interdiction personnel are physically fit and have unimpeacha-
ble integrity andjudgment). "It also has a compelling interest in preventing the
risk to the life of the citizenry posed by the potential use of deadly force by persons
suffering from impaired perception and judgment." Id. "The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is deter-
mined 'by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other hand, the degree to which it is needed for
the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' " United States v. Knight,
122 S. Ct. 587, 591 (2001). Query, whether "compelling interest" is equivalent to
"legitimate governmental interests," as the terminology has differing results de-
pending of the level of equal protection required when dealing with the Four-
teenth Amendment three-tier analysis of the: strict scrutiny test reserved for
fundamental rights and suspect classes; intermediate standard reserved for classifi-
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the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.4 9 Jus-
tice Kennedy elaborated on the "special needs" requirement: "Our
cases establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law en-
forcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expec-
tation against the Government's interests to determine whether it is
impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized sus-
picion in the particular context."50 The role that certain employees
in the Customs Department perform in protecting and guarding
the country's borders and the need for their integrity was obviously
a significant factor.51 While agreeing with the majority in Skinner,
Justice Scalia issued a stinging dissent in Von Raab.52 Based on the
evidence submitted, he concluded there was no indication that the
reasons for the drug-testing were related to drug use.5 3 Visual mon-
itoring of the employees during the actual urine test was absent in
both Skinner and Von Raab.
In Patchogue-Medford v. Board of Education,54 a Long Island
school district required that all probationary teachers seeking a per-
manent position undergo urinalysis testing for drug use.55 There
was no prior drug use by any of the teachers in this "targeted"
class. 56 In 1987, the highest court in New York, the Court of Ap-
cations based on gender and birth legitimacy; and the lowest rationale relationship
test applied to other categories.
49. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668 (imparting traditional probable cause stan-
dard may be helpful in analyzing reasonableness of routine administrative
functions).
50. Id. at 665-66.
51. See id. at 677 (informing government had compelling interest in safe-
guarding borders).
52. See id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia commented: "In my
view the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human
dignity in symbolic opposition to drug use." Id.
53. See id. at 687. Justice Scalia cited Justice Brandeis: "Experience should
teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's pur-
poses are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of
their liberty by evil-minded rulers." Id. Justice Scalia, however, authored the ma-
jority opinion in Vernonia.
54. 70 N.Y.2d 57 (1987). The reasonableness suspicion standard is the appro-
priate basis for constitutionally compelling a public school teacher to submit to a
urine test for the purpose of detecting the use of controlled substances. See id. at
69. New York's highest state court determined that the issue of consent concern-
ing the teacher's collective bargaining agreement with the school district was not
at issue because this urinalysis test was a new test not contemplated by the contract,
and therefore, no consent was provided by their teachers through their union rep-
resentation. See id. at 70. The court determined there was no need to address the
waiver issue. See id.
55. See id. at 62.
56. See id. at 63-64.
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peals, found that the action constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of both federal and state constitutional
protections.57
More recently, the Sixth Circuit in Knox County Education Ass'n
v. Knox County Board of Education,58 upheld random drug-testing of
school employees.59 Despite the fact that there was no history of
drug use by the teachers, the court found that teachers constituted
"safety sensitive" employees, and were involved in a heavily regu-
lated industry.60 The Sixth Circuit rationalized that important gov-
ernmental and community interests were at stake in requiring this
testing of teachers.61 The Sixth Circuit also sanctioned a plan that
tested for many more substances than customary. 62
57. See id. at 69-71.
58. 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999). In this case,
drug-testing was allowed even though the school board had presented no evidence
that the inattentiveness or negligence of a teacher ever contributed to, or was re-
lated in any way, to any student assaults or any security incident, or that a teacher
ever failed to report a student for the use or possession of drugs, alcohol, or weap-
ons. See id. at 365; see also English v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 938 F. Supp.
775, 779-83 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (upholding as constitutional drug-testing of
mechanic, employed by school district, who had commercial driver's license and
worked on and drove school buses, pursuant to Omnibus Transportation Em-
ployee Testing Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31306 (1991)). The regulations required the oper-
ation of a "split sample method," wherein the urinalysis sample would be split into
two samples, and upon a positive finding of the first sample, the individual could
have the second sample tested. See English, 938 F. Supp. at 779. Herein, the court
sanctioned the testing even though the testing authority had not allocated a split
sample, in finding no violation of the Fourth Amendment, nor a section 1983 due
process violation. See id.
59. See Knox, 158 F.3d at 375.
60. See id. ("In short, although the record evidence does not reflect that the
... school teachers and other such officials have a track record or a pronounced
drug problem the suspicionless testing regime is justified by the unique role they
play in the lives of school children and the in loco parentis obligations imposed
upon them."). The Sixth Circuit found that "teachers legitimate expectation of
privacy is diminished by their participation in a heavily regulated industry and by
the nature of their job .... " Id. The court clarified that prior cases demonstrated
"that the entire focus of the regulations need not be on the employees themselves,
or relate to safety per se, in order for the industry to be considered heavily regu-
lated." Id. at 383.
61. See id. at 374-75. The Sixth Circuit stated:
We can imagine few governmental interests more important to a commu-
nity than that of insuring the safety and security of its children while they
are entrusted to the care of teachers and administrators. Concomitant
with this governmental interest is the community's interest in reasonably
insuring that those who are entrusted with the care of our children will
not be induced to influence children-either directly or by example-in
the direction of illegal and dangerous activities which undermine values
which parents attempt to instill in children in the home.
Id.
62. See id. at 380. This plan exceeded the Department of Transportation's
scheme that only tested for five substances (marijuana, cocaine, opiates, amphet-
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The Fifth Circuit in United Teachers v. Orleans Parish School
Board,63 on the other hand, did not sanction the drug-testing of all
teachers; 64 however, this appellate court in Aubrey v. School Board of
Lafayette Parish,6 5 ultimately upheld the drug-testing of school custo-
dians predicated on their use of dangerous chemicals. 6 6 While
these decisions involved adults, the next section will review cases
involving minors.
IV. SEARCHES OF STUDENTS GENERALLY
In 1969, the Supreme Court announced that public school stu-
dents do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the schoolhouse
gate." 67 While this language has been the linchpin, educators, nev-
ertheless, can conduct warrantless searches of students, as the
Court concluded in New Jersey v. T.L.O.68 In T.L.O., the Supreme
Court determined that
the legality of a search of a student should depend simply
on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the
search. Determining the reasonableness of any search in-
amines and phencyclidine); herein, morphine, codeine and methamphetamines
could also be identified from the test done. See id. The court excused the broad
nature of the school plan as the employee was required to reveal information
about other drug ingestion only to the Medical Review Officer, and as such addi-
tional privacy invasion was deemed minimal. See id. at 382.
63. 142 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding there was no special need to require
pre-employment drug-testing of all district employees, as well as annual examina-
tions, noting that there was no identified problem of drug use by teachers of their
aides or other clerical workers); see also Ga. Ass'n of Educators v. Harris, 749 F.
Supp. 1110, 1113 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (preventing pre-employment drug-testing of all
applicants for state employment including teacher applicants); Bangert v. Hodel,
705 F. Supp. 643, 649 (D.D.C. 1989) (preventing random drug-testing of Depart-
ment of Interior employees, including teachers in the Bureau of Indian Affairs).
64. See United Teachers, 142 F.3d at 856-57.
65. 92 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1996) on further appeal after remand, 148 F.3d 559 (5th
Cir. 1998)
66. See id. (affirming school board's summary judgment motion). The Fifth
Circuit concluded a material issue of fact precluded the defendant School Board's
motion for summary judgment as to the constitutionality of the search. See id. at
320. Therein a school custodian was subjected to a random drug test pursuant to a
parish school board policy, which pertained to employees in "safety-sensitive" posi-
tions. See id. at 319. The Fifth Circuit stated, "Because the collection and testing of
urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as
reasonable, these intrusions are deemed searches under the Fourth Amendment
.... Notice that one will be subject to random drug-testing on the job reduces the
element of surprise, and diminishes the expectation of privacy." Id. at 318-19.
67. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding
school regulation prohibiting wearing armbands to schools (to protest Vietnam
war) and providing for suspension of any student refusing to remove such was
unconstitutional denial of student's right of expression of opinion).
68. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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volves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether
the . . . action was justified at its inception," second, one
must determine whether the search as actually conducted
"was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place." Under ordi-
nary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or
other school official will be 'justified at its inception"
when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated
or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. 69
In T.L. 0., a school administrator had reasonable suspicion that
a female student was smoking on the school grounds, in violation of
school rules. When the principal searched the coed's pocketbook
for the alleged cigarettes, he came upon marijuana cigarettes and
other drug-related paraphernalia. The Court noted: "[T] he preser-
vation of order and a proper educational environment requires
close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of
rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if under-
taken by an adult."70 The Court mentioned the special needs that
arise when involved with a school setting:
It is evident that the school setting requires some easing of
the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are
ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in particu-
lar, is unsuited to the school environment: requiring a
teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child sus-
pected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal
law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the
swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools.
7 1
69. Id. at 341-42 (emphasis added); see a/soJenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of
Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 824 (11th Cir. 1997) (proffering Supreme Court in T.L.O. did
not apply its own enunciated two-part test); Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F.
Supp. 1354, 1361 (D. Or. 1992); Patchogue-Medford Cong. of Teachers v. Bd. of
Educ., 70 N.Y.2d 57, 68 (N.Y. 1987) (underscoring in dicta, "[w]e noted that given
the special responsibility of school teachers in the control of the school precincts
and the grave threat, even lethal threat, of drug abuse among school children, the
basis for finding sufficient cause for a school search will be less than that required
outside the school precincts.") (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court found
"[s]uch a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction." T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 342.
70. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (recognizing that maintaining security and order
in schools requires certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures).
71. See id. at 338.
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The Court stressed, however, that " [e]xceptions to the requirement
of individualized suspicion are generally appropriate only where
the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where
'other safeguards' are available to assure that the individual's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of
the official in the field."' 72 Nonetheless, the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the search. 73 The Court stated: "The school setting
72. Id. at 342 (finding it was not necessary to consider circumstances that
might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individual-
ized suspicion since the Court concluded search of student's purse was based upon
individualized suspicion).
73. For cases dealing with searches of students for weapons, stolen property,
alcohol and drugs (not involving drug-testing mechanisms), see Jenkins v. Tal-
ladega City Bd. of Educ., 95 F.3d 1036, 1036 (l1th Cir. 1996) (ruling strip search
of two eight-year-old students for seven dollars was improper), reh'g en banc revg
prior Circuit Court decision & afg district court's granting of summary judgment to all
defendants, 115 F.3d 821, 822, 828 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding teacher and school
guidance counselor involved would be entitled to qualified immunity due to their
role in conducting searches of student for stolen money), cert. denied, sub nom.
Jenkins v. Herring, 522 U.S. 966 (1997). "In the absence of detailed guidance, no
reasonable school official could glean from these broadly-worded phrases whether
the search of a younger or older student might be deemed more or less intrusive
.... Similarly, school officials cannot be required to construe general legal formu-
lations that have not once been applied to a specific set of facts by any binding
judicial authority." Id. at 825-27; State v. J.A., 679 So. 2d 316, 317-18 (Fla. 1996)
(upholding random, suspicionless pat-down search of student for weapon in class-
room conducted by deputy sheriff at request of assistant principal, in a post-
Vernonia decision). The Florida state court stated: "However, because of the state's
custodial and tutorial authority over the student, public school students are subject
to a greater degree of control and administrative supervision than is permitted
over a free adult." Id. at 319; DesRoches v. Caprio, 156 F.3d 571, 572-73 (4th Cir.
1998) (analyzing school's attempted search of contents of male ninth grade stu-
dent's backpack concerning missing pair of female student's tennis sneakers).
Upon student's refusal, he was suspended for ten days and commenced a Section
1983 action. See DesRouches, 156 F.3d at 573. The Fourth Circuit found the pro-
posed search was reasonable pursuant to Fourth Amendment stating: "Whether
any given search was justified at its inception must be adjudged according to the
circumstances existing at the moment that particular search began, rather than, as
the district court believed, the circumstances existing when the first student in the
class was searched." Id. at 577; see also Higginbottom v. Keithly, 103 F. Supp. 2d
1075, 1078, 1088 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (holding strip search did not violate students'
equal protection rights); Rhodes v. Guarricino, 54 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189, 195
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (upholding search of students' hotel room during class trip at
request of school principal; which revealed alcohol and marijuana); Rasmus v. Ari-
zona, 939 F. Supp. 709, 712-13 (D. Ariz. 1996) (determining detention of emotion-
ally handicapped student, with attention-deficit disorder, briefly confined in a
windowless "time-out" room, which was former closet, constituted question of fact
as to whether Fourth Amendment was violated); Juran v. Indep. Cent. Sch. Dist.
13J, 898 F. Supp. 728, 732-33 (D. Or. 1995) (upholding detention and administra-
tion of breathalyzer test to male student without a warrant); Singleton v. Bd. of
Educ., 894 F. Supp. 386, 388-89 (D. Kan. 1995) (upholding constitutionality of
warrantless school search of middle school student's personal locker, accused of
stealing $150, as well as search of student's locker, applying two-prong test con-
tained in T.L.O.); People v. Pruitt, 662 N.E.2d 540, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (con-
15
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requires some 'easing' of the restrictions to enable school adminis-
trators to preserve order and maintain an adequate educational en-
vironment. ' 74 It added: "Furthermore, the school official's primary
reason was not to ferret out crime, but to instead teach students in a
safe and secure environment. '75
V. DRUG-TESTING PROCEDURES
In crafting a drug-testing program, by identifying who or what
will trigger the right to be tested and whether the program requires
cluding random metal detector screening of students in public school did not
constitute unreasonable search), appeal denied, 667 N.E.2d 1061 (Ill. 1996); S.A. v.
Indiana, 654 N.E.2d 791, 797 (Ind. App. 1995) (holding search of student's book
bag was justified); State v. Burroughs, 926 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tenn. 1996) (deter-
mining no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when private college dormitory
director found drugs during search of student's room).
Contra B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1999)
(ruling canine sniffing of student and his property constituted unreasonable
search); Oliver v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218-19 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (finding
strip-search of seventh-grade female student to ascertain whether she had stolen
$4.50 from another student was an unreasonable search. Furthermore, the two
teachers involved with the search were not entitled to qualified immunity).
A number of cases, issued since T.L.O., have upheld the constitutionality of
locker searches. See, e.g., Singleton v. Bd. of Educ., 894 F. Supp. 386, 391 (D. Kan.
1995) (holding locker search did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights); In
the Interest of Isiah B., 500 N.W.2d 637, 650 (Wis. 1993) (concluding no Fourth
Amendment violation based on locker search since no reasonable expectation of
privacy in locker), cert. denied, sub nom. Isiah B. v. Wisconsin, 510 U.S. 884 (1993);
Commonwealth v. Synder, 597 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Mass. 1992) (ruling school had
probable cause to search student's locker); In rejoseph G., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 902,
906 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding search of student's locker, which contained
firearm, was reasonable). Contra Commonwealth v. Cass, 666 A.2d 313, 318 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995) (determining canine sniffing of students' lockers for drugs at
Pennsylvania school did not violate Fourth Amendment where resultant search
produced evidence of marijuana and drug paraphernalia).
Other older cases, issued prior to T.L.O., have upheld searches in academic
settings. See, e.g., Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980) (determining
canine sniffing of students for drug use without individualized suspicion did not
constitute search, however, nude strip searches of students without prior individu-
alized suspicion was unreasonable), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022 (1981); Tarter v.
Raybuck, 556 F. Supp. 625, 628-29 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (concluding consensual
search of student's person for marijuana did not violate constitutionally protected
right); Bahr v. Kenkins, 539 F. Supp. 483, 488-89 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (validating war-
rantless search of student's purse for firecracker justified where administrator had
reasonable suspicion and probable cause); In re Guillermo M., 181 Cal. Rptr. 856,
857-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (upholding search of student's pocket for knives);
State v. D.T.W., 425 So. 2d 1383, 1387-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
teacher aide's discovery of drug paraphernalia in open view in student's car fully
justified and reasonable). Contra Homer v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690
F.2d 470, 488 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding canine sniffing of students for drugs with-
out individual suspicion constituted unreasonable search), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
1207 (1983).
74. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
75. Id.
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mandatory random testing, the following two aspects must be ad-
dressed: (1) the testing procedure, including procedural safe-
guards; and (2) what substances or methods will be tested.
A. Methods of Detection
"Clearance time" refers to the time it takes for the human body
to clear itself of a drug so as not to trigger a positive drug test. An
athlete may use prohibited substances, and thus violate the rules,
but if the test is not administered within a certain period of its use,
the test will be negative. Drug-testing methods include breathalyzer
testing, hair (radioimmunoassay) testing, saliva testing, urinalysis
testing, blood testing, or use of endocrine profiles. 76 Blood testing
is considered grossly invasive, but yields the broadest and most tell-
ing results. Nonetheless, the universal type of testing presently
used in athletics is urinalysis testing, although use of blood tests is
now being used for certain Olympic athletes and professional cy-
clists involved with the Tour de France.
Urinalysis testing is the prevalent modality used for interscho-
lastic athletics. The first urinalysis test utilized was the enzyme mul-
tiplied immunoassay technique ("EMIT"). Then, urinalysis testing
entered the moderm age of detection in 1983 with the introduction
of the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry ("GC/MS")
method, which is generally more accurate and more expensive.
More recently, carbon isotope ratio ("CIR") testing has entered the
pantheon.
The collection process is straightforward. 77 First, the athlete
receives notification of his selection for a urinalysis test. Next, a
urine sample is obtained from the athlete at a certain location.
Before the sample is obtained, however, the athlete may be asked to
identify whether he is taking any medications, which could influ-
ence the results. This initial mandated disclosure is also an attempt
to circumvent post-positive test theories that explain away the
results.
When the athlete delivers the sample, some regimes allow for
visual monitoring of the urination by the athlete to prevent tamper-
76. "Endocrine function is assessed by accurately measuring the concentra-
tion of hormones present in the blood. Even though circulating concentrations
are low ... precise assays based on competitive protein binding are widely availa-
ble." 2 CECIL BOOK OF MEDICINE 1201 (Claude Bennett et al. eds., 19th ed. 1992).
Endocrine profiles can also be developed through urinalysis testing.
77. For a detailed explanation of the collection process, see BOB GOLDMAN,
M.D. & RONALD KLATZ, M.D., DEATH IN THE LOCKER RooM II: DRUGS AND SPORTS
228-29 (1995).
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ing. All contemporary urinalysis-testing methods use a split sample
method, whereby the urine sample is divided into two sub-samples,
generally designated "A" and "B." The "B" sample is used for the
confirmation test. Generally, the athlete is given a control number,
so that the testing laboratory would not know the name of the ath-
lete involved to insure the integrity of the results.
The sample is then sent to the testing laboratory, generally an
accredited laboratory for this type of specialized testing. First, the
"A" sample is tested. If it tests positive, then the "B" sample is like-
wise tested. An athlete may be notified upon a positive determina-
tion of the "A" sample. If the "B" sample tests positive, then the
positive test of the "A" sample and the confirmation of the "B" sam-
ple will generally result in an overall positive test. Some protocols
test the "A" sample through the EMIT process or thin-layer chroma-
tography, and the "B" sample through the mass spectrometer pro-
cess. The tester will generally use the gas chromatography or mass
spectrometry method for the second test. This action may be un-
dertaken due to the cost factor involved. Drug-testing is an expen-
sive proposition. The initial test can run between $10-$60 per
sample, whereas, the confirmation test can cost $100 or more per
test.78 It should be noted, however, that even the GC/MS method
has its limitations, as it can detect only for substances programmed
into it. Additionally, the sanctity of the chain of custody must be
maintained.
B. Substances Tested and Methods Used
In general, there are twenty major classifications of drugs by
use and effect, including narcotics, anesthetics, vitamins (diet sup-
plements), central nervous system stimulants and depressants. His-
torically, athletes have tried different substances for a competitive
edge.79 Generally, the athletic-based drug-testing inquiry focuses
on two types of drugs: performance-enhancing drugs, also known as
ergogenic aids, and recreational "street" drugs or psychoactive
drugs. In addition to using drugs for the alleged performance-en-
hancing qualities, "a number of athletes abuse drugs to prevent fa-
78. See KEN LIsKA, THE PHARMACIST'S GUIDE TO THE MOST MISUSED & ABUSED
DRUGS IN AMERICA 102 (1988) (discussing confirmation can be accomplished by
gas chromatography, high-performance liquid chromatography, or through utiliza-
tion of gas chromatography-mass spectroscopy).
79. See EDWARD F. DOLAN, DRUGS IN SPORTS 17 (2d ed. 1992).
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tigue, mask pain, cope with increased stress, and deal with
heightened emotional confusion." 80
The testing is for exogenous (outside the body) substances;
that is, substances that the body did not naturally provide or pro-
duce. Exogenous substances generally involve alteration of the:
(1) endocrine (hormonal) system to promote muscles or tissue
growth and repair; or (2) the circulatory system by increasing oxy-
gen in the blood. While these substances may enhance athletic per-
formance, they may also have possible side effects. Remarkably,
most interscholastic testing regimes do not test for standard per-
formance-enhancing drugs (such as anabolic-androgenic steroids),
but rather concentrate on the identification of the use of recrea-
tional drugs or alcohol.
1. Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids
Anabolic (tissue-building)-androgenic (masculizing) steroids
("anabolic steroids") are chemical compounds that promote tissue
growth by creating protein and other new substances. 81 The main
anabolic steroids are compounds derived from testosterone or syn-
thetic forms of testosterone, which is the chief male sex hormone,
although women's bodies also contain trace amounts of testoster-
one. 82 Steroids may be used in a multitude of ways, including:
stacking, or using more than one anabolic steroid; using a shotgun
approach, whereby multiple drugs are taken by multiple routes; cy-
cling the drugs; staggering the drugs; and using the steroids with
other substances.8 3 Dangers of using anabolic steroids depend on
the sex, age and physical condition of the men, women and young
children who use them.8 4 Anabolic steroid use may have physical,
80. Charles Feeney Knapp, Drug-testing and the Student-Athlete: Meeting the Con-
stitutional Challenge, 76 IowA L. REv. 107, 112 (1990).
81. See Glenn D. Braunstein, M.D., Anabolic Steroid Use to Enhance Athletes' Per-
formance, 65 S.C. L. REv. 373, 374 (1991). Androgens are steroid hormones that
promote the growth of male organs and other masculine attributes such as body
and facial hair, larger muscles, and acne among other attributes. See id.; see alsoJim
Thurston, Chemical Warfare: Battling Steroids in Athletics, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 93, 97-
99 (1990) (providing history of anabolic steroid use).
82. See Braunstein, supra note 81, at 374-75 (describing characteristics and ef-
fects of anabolic steroids).
83. See id. at 378-79; see also Martin J. Bidwill & David L. Katz, M.D., Injecting
New Life Into an Old Defense: Anabolic Steroid- Induced Psychosis as a Paradigm of Invol-
untary Intoxication, 7 U. MtAsii ENr. & SPORTS L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1989) (discussing
various methods of steroid use); Thurston, supra note 81, at 103-05 (describing
"pyramiding" and "stacking" as uses).
84. See Braunstein, supra note 81, at 376-81 (discussing risks that children,
adolescents and women can face as compared to males).
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sexual and psychological effects, including: biochemical abnormali-
ties of the liver function; fluid retention properties that may lead to
hypertension or heart disease; oligospermia (decreased production
of sperm); gynecomastin (enlargement of breast tissue); and
psychosocial damage, also known as "roid rage. ' 85 This use also af-
fects pre-adolescents and early adolescents, whereby premature fu-
sion of long bones can result in stunted growth. 86 Steroid use is
being supplanted by an assortment of other legal and illegal
substances.
2. Other Substances and Methods
Other performance-enhancing substances include peptide hor-
mones and analogues such as human chorionic gonatrophin
("HCG"), human growth hormones ("HGH"), and recombinant er-
thropietin ("EPO"). Misuse of HGH can lead to the Frankenstein
syndrome, medically known as acromegaly, which is an enlarge-
ment of the extremities, including the hands, feet, forehead and
nose. HGH has been available in synthetic form since 1982. It has
the same anabolic effects as steroids, but it is currently only detecta-
ble through blood testing, although a new test is imminent. EPO, a
synthetic hormone that stimulates red blood cell production in
bone marrow, has been available since 1988.
Other categories and substances include: narcotics; insulin
growth factor ("IGF"); stimulants, such as amphetamines and co-
caine; beta-blockers, which can calm the nerves of athletes; "brak-
ing" drugs, which are used by females to stop the onset of their
menstrual cycle (which may aid in sports such as gymnastics and
figure skating where smaller body types are more desirable); diuret-
ics and masking agents; and more recently legal substances, such as
herbal supplements (for example, androstenedidone or "andro,"
an adrenal hormone that increases the body's ability to produce
testosterone; creatine;87 and Ephedra, which is also known as Ma
Huang).
Use of street or recreational drugs may also be prohibited even
when it may not be clear that they have any performance-enhanc-
ing quality. These street drugs include heroin, marijuana and THC.
Cocaine is generally placed in the stimulant category. Alcohol is
85. See id. at 379-80.
86. See id. at 380-81.
87. Mike Freeman, NFL. Is Uneasy About Diet Supplements' Use, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 1998, § 8, at 7. "Creatine is a powdery, synthetic version of a substance created
in the liver and kidneys." Id. Thousands of athletes, including college and high
school athletes, use it to increase muscle mass. See id.
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the most accessible substance for student-athletes, which can have
deleterious effects.
VI. DRUG-TESTING CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVING INTERSCHOLASTIC
STUDENT-ATHLETES
There are a number of issues involved with random suspi-
cionless urinalysis drug-testing of interscholastic athletes, including:
(1) "voluntary" consent of the minors, or their parents or legal
guardians; (2) efficacy of the governmental interest; (3) Fourth
Amendment parameters; (4) privacy concerns; and (5) examina-
tion of the substance being tested: drugs versus alcohol use. The
first issue is the alleged voluntary consent of minors, which is gener-
ally given a perfunctory review. This consideration includes:
(a) The captive audience problem: Since, in general, the
students are required to attend school (at least until a cer-
tain age) and the school requires a signed consent form,
the query is whether a student who wants to participate in
interscholastic athletics voluntarily consents. This situa-
tion clearly differs from the employment situation or pur-
suing a post-secondary education where an individual has
a multitude of choices, as opposed to the K-12 academic
situation where the choice in attending a particular public
school is clearly restricted for the student.
(b) The consent form or actual consent: What is the exact
language utilized and does the alleged informed consent
balance with the waiving of a fundamental constitutional
right?
The second issue concerns the government's rationale and what
standard will be applied, including:
(a) An inquiry as to whether there really is a drug problem
in the athletics department must be conducted.
(b) What level of governmental interest is required? Must
a "compelling" governmental interest be established ver-
sus a "substantial" governmental interest, or some other
level of government interest be proven by the educational
institution?
(c) Assuming arguendo a compelling governmental interest
standard, does the school's articulated or purported com-
pelling governmental interest rise to the level required?
While the benefits of targeting protection of national se-
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curity or significant national safety of citizens are properly
rationalized, the reasoning of targeting only interscholas-
tic athletes is less so.
(d) Efficacy in achieving the purported goal: Has the
drug-testing program in fact resulted in alleviating the al-
leged drug problem?
(e) Another troubling aspect, which is routinely given
short-shrift, is that the drug-testing programs operate with
no expiration date; rather they are routinely open-ended,
and as such can continue theoretically in perpetuity.
The third area centers on the Fourth Amendment:
(a) Whether such warrantless searches are beyond the
scope and intention of our forefathers.
(b) Since dealing with minors, the courts should endeavor
to impose a greater scrutiny as to its sanctity (although the
courts have deemed to impose a lesser scrutiny).
(c) Is there overreaching by encompassing all interscho-
lastic athletes for the actions of a few?
(d) Additionally, a common denominator is that uni-
formly the individuals credited for needing a drug-testing
program are based solely on the actions of males. No gen-
der-based argument to exclude females has been raised in
any of the cases.
(e) Regardless of the lack of criminal penalties imposed
when a positive test is established, there is still a criminal
taint of using controlled substances.
The fourth area concerns the privacy aspect:
(a) For example, the logic of the syllogism that undressing
in a public locker room equates to an implied consent by
students to allow non-medical personnel to possibly view
and collect urine specimens, and have bodily excretions
tested.
(b) Should visual monitoring during the specimen gather-
ing process be permitted?
(c) Should physicians or medically-trained personnel, and
not coaches or teachers, be responsible for the specimen
gathering process?
(d) Are a student's privacy protections violated when, as
part of the drug testing process, they must also reveal all
other medications they are taking?
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(e) Should any type of testing of student-athletes be re-
stricted to urinalysis testing and not blood testing?
The fifth area centers on whether the program concerns only se-
lected drugs, or both the use of drugs and alcohol, which is a more
readily available substance with equally damaging effects:88
(a) Are both performance-enhancing and recreational
drugs prohibited? What about the prohibition of legal
substances? 89
(b) Regardless, schools accord discipline by virtue of cur-
tailing or restricting a student-athlete's athletic eligibility
when there is a transgression of the drug and alcohol
policies. 90
88. The appeal the Supreme Court will hear in March 2002 concerns a testing
policy that does not test for alcohol. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278
(10th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of Earls, see infra notes 229-50 and accompany-
ing text.
89. See Schul v. Sherard, 102 F. Supp. 2d 877, 881 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (address-
ing coach's alleged remarks about benefits of caffeine and First Amendment free-
dom of speech and freedom of assembly and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights). In Schul, a high school track coach was placed on administra-
tive leave after advocating the use of caffeine as a performance-enhancer. See id. at
881-82. The defendant school administrators filed a motion for summary judg-
ment after the coach brought suit, and the district court granted the motion dis-
missing all claims. See id. at 891. The court found, among other things, that the
coach's statements to an athlete regarding the use of caffeine were not that of a
citizen speaking on a matter of public concern, which would be necessary for the
court to review a governmental employer's personnel decision for protection pur-
suant to freedom of speech. See id. at 885-86.
90. See Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1041
(E.D. Wis. 2000) (expounding upon school's athletic code of conduct providing
that student athletes be suspended for at least one game or meet for violations
involving use of alcohol, tobacco, or use, possession, or sale of controlled sub-
stances); Farver v. Bd. of Educ., 40 F. Supp. 2d 323, 325 (D. Md. 1999) (concluding
no First Amendment freedom of assembly right nor Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights were transgressed where students attended party off school grounds
where alcohol was served in violation of school's anti-alcohol policy pertaining to
extracurricular participants including interscholastic athletes); Pirschel v. Sorrell,
2 F. Supp. 2d 930, 932-33 (E.D. Ky. 1998) (addressing student's unsuccessful Sec-
tion 1983 action challenging violation of school's anti-alcohol policy based on alco-
hol found in parking lot at basketball tournament held at another high school);
Palmer v. Merluzzi, 689 F. Supp. 400, 416 (D.N.J. 1988) (finding no Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection or procedural due process violation in case brought
by male student-athlete, who challenged termination of his athletic eligibility for
sixty-day period based on his alleged violation of school's anti-drug and alcohol
policy); Jordan ex. rel. Edwards v. O'Fallon Township High Sch. Dist., 706 N.E.2d
137, 138-39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (examining claim of high school football player
who violated zero tolerance drug and alcohol policy for alleged use of alcohol); see
also Stearns v. Bd. of Educ., 1999 WL 1044832, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999) (male
student, recovering alcoholic, unsuccessfully challenged his suspension from boys'
varsity high school basketball team for violating school's anti-alcohol policy, based
on two federal disability statutes, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.
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VII. PRE-VERNONIA DECISIONS
While the Supreme Court took an intrusive view into the rights
of minors at educational institutions, other courts have been reluc-
tant to allow the abridgment of students' rights simply because of
that designation, especially when there is no evidence of drug use
in the designated class subject to drug-testing. For example, in
1985, the Western District of Arkansas found the results of an EMIT
urinalysis examination of public high school students suspected of
marijuana use unconstitutional. 9 1 While the results could arguably
detect marijuana use, they could not pinpoint whether the alleged
use of the prohibited substances was done during school hours to
trigger the school policy involved; additionally, there was insuffi-
cient evidence to justify the intrusive measures utilized, including
visual monitoring during the urinalysis testing. 9 2 The district court
stated: "Schools may not expel students merely because they may
have ingested an unknown quantity of a marijuana-like substance of
unknown quality, producing an unknown pharmacological effect,
at some unascertained point in time within the preceding weeks."
93
Also in 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that a high
school's policy of requiring all students to undergo an annual physi-
cal examination, which included urine tests to determine the pres-
ence of controlled substances, was unreasonable. 94
A. Seventh Circuit: Pro
In 1988, the Seventh Circuit became the first federal circuit to
examine the constitutionality of a drug-testing program of inter-
scholastic student-athletes and cheerleaders when it decided Schaill
§ 794 (1994), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12213
(1994)). See generally Diane Heckman, Athletic Associations and Disabled Student-Ath-
letes in the 1990's, 143 EDuc. L. REP. 1, 17-18 (2000) (discussing filing of Stern
lawsuit).
91. See Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 44 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (challenging
school's policy pursuant to Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments), modified in part,
663 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Ark. 1985). In Anable, students challenged the constitu-
tionality of a school's drug and alcohol policy and the procedures involved under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 25.
92. See id. at 39-41 (explaining nature of EMIT test).
93. Id. at 40. In citing T.L.O., the court stated: "T.L.O. made clear that the
permissible regulatory scope of school officials extends only to 'maintaining disci-
pline in the classroom and on school grounds and during school functions." Id.
(quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
94. See Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Reg'l Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709,
713 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
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v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.95 The court found that the testing
program constituted a reasonable search under the Fourth Amend-
ment and did not negate due process protections afforded by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 96  The court explained that
"[p] articipation in interscholastic athletics is a benefit carrying with
it enhanced prestige and status in the student community. It is not
unreasonable to couple these benefits with an obligation to un-
dergo drug-testing. '97 Ultimately, the court concluded that "the
school's interest in preserving a drug-free athletic program is sub-
stantial, and cannot adequately be furthered by less intrusive mea-
sures . *.".."98 The record established that at least three student
injuries were caused or exacerbated by drug impairment. Previ-
ously, five out of sixteen members of the spring 1986 boys' baseball
team at the Indiana high school had tested positive for marijuana. 99
The drug-testing provided for the collection of the specimen while
in a closed bathroom stall with no visual monitoring. 100 The pro-
gram provided for confidentiality and allowed students to challenge
the first positive tests by subjecting the sample to another test rou-
tinely found in most drug-testing programs. 10 1 The only penalty
imposed was the loss of athletic eligibility for a certain period. 10 2
The court focused on the athletes' diminished expectation of pri-
vacy because of the communal undress and the nature of the physi-
95. 864 F.2d 1309, 1324 (7th Cir. 1988) (rejecting claim brought by students
to enjoin imposition of school's requirement that interscholastic athletes and
cheerleaders consent to random urinalysis testing to be eligible to compete in in-
terscholastic sports).
96. See id. at 1313, 1322-24 (describing program provided for confirmatory
testing at no cost to students and furthermore provided students with notice of test
results and opportunity to rebut positive results).
97. Id. at 1320. The court added: "Drug usage by this widely admired group is
likely to affect the behavior of others and school authorities are within their discre-
tion in conducting a program specifically directed at athletes." Id. at 1321.
98. Id. at 1322 (proclaiming that interscholastic athletes have diminished ex-
pectations of privacy, and have voluntarily chosen to participate in activity which
subjects them to pervasive regulation of off-campus behavior).
99. See id. at 1310 (identifying that based on these results, board of trustees
decided to institute random urine testing program for interscholastic athletes in
school system).
100. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1311. The result was that "[t]he invasion of pri-
vacy [was] therefore not nearly as severe as would be the case if the monitor were
required to observe the subject in the act of urination." Id. at 1318.
101. See id. at 1311 (indicating chain of custody of sample taken is designed to
insure accuracy and anonymity of testing procedure).
102. See id. (detailing that first positive urinalysis test results in suspension
from thirty percent of athletic contests, second positive results in a fifty percent
suspension, third positive causes suspension for full calendar year and fourth posi-
tive results in student being barred from all interscholastic athletic competitions
during remainder of student's high school career).
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cal examinations, which required a urine sample as part of the
mandatory physical examination.10 3 The court pointed out that the
affected students were highly regulated.10 4 Consequently, the court
underscored that "sports are quite distinguishable from almost any
other activity." 10 5 The Seventh Circuit relied on this rationale for
describing the school's action, which included specific prior evi-
dence of drug related injuries, disciplinary concerns engendered by
the improper drug use and the non-punitive nature of the penal-
ties. 10 6 Also, the mechanics of the drug-testing program resembled
a model program. However, justifying the across-the-board testing
of all student-athletes and cheerleaders based on only eight inci-
dents while satisfying the defendant's burden to establish a record
certainly seems overreaching on the part of the appellate court, es-
pecially in light of the significant constitutional protection these
students impliedly waived. There was no judicial discussion to limit
the testing to members of the boys' baseball team.
The Seventh Circuit also stressed that the athletes were accus-
tomed to communal undressing. However, the logic that someone
implicitly consents to having a private function like urination
viewed or tested or collected simply because one happens to occa-
sionally undress does not seem to be a foundation upon which con-
stitutional rights may be eroded. The logic also seems strained as to
the academic institution that provides the locker room facilities,
which routinely do not allow for private undressing rooms even if
an athlete or cheerleader so desired (the absence of private locker
stalls saves space and money in the construction of the locker
rooms). The court also highly considered the fact that the athletes
were the role models of the community. While certain student-ath-
letes may be popular, that status does not necessarily equate being
role models. Regardless, the reason for subjecting the cheerleaders
to drug-testing stands on even slimmer grounds, considering there
was no evidence of drug use by them. The cheerleaders were also
103. See id. at 1318.
104. See id. As evidence, the court pointed to the minimum grade require-
ment, as well as residency and eligibility requirements, levied by the Indiana High
School Athletic Association. See id. Moreover, the court stressed, "[r]andom test-
ing of athletes does not necessarily imply random testing of band member or the
chess team." Id. at 1319. It further elaborated: "Our decision today should not be
read as endorsing urine testing of all students attending a school." Id. at 1319
n.10.
105. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319 (remarking monitored collection and subse-
quent testing of urine samples can hardly come as shock or surprise under present-
day circumstances).
106. See id. at 1322. The court stated that "[t]he program is not intended to
discover evidence of unlawful activity for use in criminal prosecution." Id.
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not subject to the range and extent of regulations and tangible ben-
efits that cover interscholastic athletes, such as access to a multitude
of collegiate athletic scholarships and media coverage.
Conversely, in 1989, a Texas federal district court found that a
school district policy, which required all junior and high school stu-
dents seeking to engage in any extracurricular activities to undergo
drug-testing, constituted an unreasonable search. 10 7 A Michigan
state trial court also concluded that drug-testing of interscholastic
student-athletes was an unreasonable search) s0 8 The Michigan
court found no proof of "drug or alcohol abuse by any segment of
the student population, including athletes."1 0 9
VIII. SUPREME COURT DECISION IN VERNONIA SCHOOL DISTRICT
47J v. ACTON
A. Ninth Circuit: Con
In 1992, the Oregon federal district court in Acton v. Vernonia
School District °10 ruled that the school district's drug-testing program
targeting only interscholastic athletes was a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment."1 The drug-testing policy was insti-
tuted in 1989 after incidents of drug use by both athletes and stu-
dents at the grade school and high school levels increased." 2 All
interscholastic student-athletes would be subject to drug-testing at
the beginning of the athletic season in which they competed, and
107. See Brooks v. East Chambers Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759,
765-66 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd without published opinion, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.
1991). But see Todd v. Rush County Schs., 983 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Ind. 1997), affd,
133 F.3d 984, 986-87 (7th Cir. 1998) (sanctioning testing of students involved with
extracurricular athletics), reh'g en banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998).
108. See Hess v. Melvindale-North Allen Park Sch. Dist., No. 9-010-383CZ (Cir.
Ct. Wayne 1991).
109. Charles A. Palmer, Drugs vs. Privacy: The New Game in Sports, 2 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 175, 187 (1992).
110. 796 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
granted, sub nom. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 513 U.S. 1013 (1994) (examin-
ing federal lawsuit commenced by plaintiff parents against defendant school dis-
trict, in small rural Oregon logging-based community, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief based on claims that school district's drug-testing policy violates
their son's right under Fourth Amendment and Oregon Constitution).
111. See Vernonia, 796 F. Supp. at 1368 (holding drug-testing was but one part
of substantial number of other rules and regulations governing athletes). "The
court held that private interests had to give way to the district's need to maintain
order and protect its students from injury by use of the least intrusive means availa-
ble to it." Id.
112. See id. at 1356-58 (informing drug-testing program was instituted to cor-
rect behavior and deter future unlawful conduct, it was not designed to punish
students for past conduct and did not expose students to possible criminal sanc-
tions or investigation).
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then throughout the season. 113 Monitors could observe the urina-
tion process of the males behind the boys' back from a distance of
at least twelve feet, while the females were allowed to use closed
bathroom stalls.1 14 Parents for a seventh-grade male student, who
wanted to participate on the football team, commenced this action
on his behalf.115
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision in
1994.116 The Ninth Circuit decided the issue of the program's con-
stitutionality under the Oregon Constitution, because it provided
greater constitutional protection when compared to the Fourth
Amendment; but it did refer to the Fourth Amendment and appli-
cable case law.117 The Ninth Circuit also recognized that suspi-
cionless administrative searches may withstand a state constitutional
challenge. 118 The Ninth Circuit recited four factors to be reviewed:
(1) the importance of the governmental interests; (2) the
degree of physical and psychological intrusion on the citi-
zen's rights; (3) the amount of discretion the procedure
vests in individual officials; and (4) the efficacy of the pro-
cedure-that is how well it contributes to the reaching of its
purported goals and how necessary it is. 119
The Ninth Circuit then found two factors weighing in favor of the
district's drug-testing policy. 120 First, the court analyzed the efficacy
factor, because it contributed to reaching the desired goals of an
113. See id. at 1358 (requiring all students who desire to participate in inter-
scholastic athletics to sign form authorizing district to conduct tests on urine speci-
men provided by students as prerequisite to participation in athletic program). All
students participating in sports that season are placed in a "pool" and each week
ten percent of the names were drawn to be tested throughout the day. See id.
114. See id. (describing samples are sent for testing to laboratories under se-
curity procedures designed to protect chain of possession). The test screens for
amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana and alcohol and has an accuracy of approxi-
mately 99.94%. See id. Test results were reported to the school district. See id.
115. See id. at 1359 (explaining parents and son objected to drug-testing pol-
icy because it required son to submit to urinalysis in absence of any individualized
evidence that he had used drugs or alcohol).
116. See Vernonia, 23 F.3d at 1516.
117. See id. at 1523 (pursuant to Oregon Constitution, warrant is always suffi-
cient authority for search).
118. See id. at 1521 (explicating that criminal search is not permissible unless
it conforms with warrant clause or falls within recognized exception to warrant
requirement).
119. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), finding these
are factors that Oregon Supreme Court identified and adopted and determining
that random search procedure which passed muster under these factors were not
unreasonable under either Fourth Amendment or Oregon Constitution).
120. See id. at 1522.
[Vol. 9: p. 209
28
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol9/iss2/1
2002] DRUG TESTING OF INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETES 237
improvement in discipline, a reduction in disciplinary referrals, and
a decrease in drug use and its glorification; although, the court ac-
knowledged that the exact nature of the policy's goals was not en-
tirely clear.121 Second, the court examined the discretionary factor,
because the policy vested no discretion in the school district
officials. 122
While the Ninth Circuit recognized a number of federal deci-
sions that allowed drug-testing of certain employees, it stated: "It
can, therefore, be readily seen that although the courts have been
willing - perhaps too willing - to allow employee drug-testing,
they have done so in cases fraught with danger where the interests
of the person to be tested were attenuated." 123 The court under-
scored that while, "[c]hildren are compelled to attend school ...
nothing suggests that they lose their right to privacy in their excre-
tory functions when they do so."124 The court added that "[t] here
simply is no sufficient basis for saying that the privacy interests of
students are much less robust than the interests of people in gen-
eral." 125 The court also refused to say "that the privacy interests of
athletes are substantially lower than those of students in gen-
eral."12 6 As such, " [t] raining rules and grade point average require-
ments are not the sort of extensive government regulation that has
been found to diminish the expectation of privacy of workers in
high risk industries or high security areas of the government."' 27
Furthermore, the court rejected the school district's argument that
school locker room conditions reduce an athlete's privacy
expectations. 128
The school district filed an appeal, which was accepted by the
Supreme Court because of the conflict between federal circuit
121. See id. (exhibiting that every teacher who testified noticed improvement
in discipline, reduction in discipline referrals, and decrease in drug use and glorifi-
cation of drug culture since policy was implemented).
122. See Vernonia, 23 F.3d at 1522 (reporting testing is conducted on random
lottery basis throughout athletic season).
123. Id. at 1524-25 (stressing efficacy of policy must be considered with all
principles in mind).
124. Id. at 1525 (recognizing while students must attend classes and follow
school rules, that does not indicate they have given up their basic privacy rights).
125. Id. (holding student's interest in privacy is not of minimal kind that had
been found to justify random searches in past).
126. Id.
127. Vernonia, 23 F.3d at 1522.
128. See id. at 1525. The court stated: "Normal locker room or restroom activ-
ities are a far cry from having an authority figure watch, listen to, and gather the
results of one's urination." Id.
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courts. 129 The arguments advanced by the petitioner, Vernonia
School District, in support of the district's position that the dis-
trict's drug-testing program was a constitutionally reasonable
search, provided the road map for the Court's decision. The dis-
trict argued:
(A) [the Supreme Court] has long recognized qualitative
differences between the constitutional remedies to which
students and adults are entitled. In the school setting, stu-
dents' constitutional rights are diminished; (B) this Court
also treats the school setting differently for purposes of
searches under the Fourth Amendment, and holds that
searches in the school setting are reasonable in the ab-
sence of a warrant or probable cause .... 130
B. Supreme Court Decision
In upholding the urinalysis testing in Skinner,13 1 the Supreme
Court stated: "The regulations do not require that samples be fur-
nished under the direct observation of a monitor .... The sample
is also collected in a medical environment, by personnel unrelated
to the railroad employer, and is thus not unlike similar procedures
encountered often in the context of a regular physical examina-
tion.' 13 2 On June 26, 1995, in a six to three decision, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of urinalysis random drug-test-
ing of interscholastic athletes pursuant to the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments in Vernonia.133 Justice Scalia wrote the
129. See generallyVernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 513 U.S. 1013 (1994) (com-
paring Seventh Circuit decision in Schaill, which conflicted with Ninth Circuit deci-
sion in Vernonia).
130. Brief for Petitioner at 17, 21, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 513 U.S.
1013 (1994) (No. 94-590).
131. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
132. Id. at 626.
133. 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (majority decision consisted of Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer, along with a concurrence by
Justice Ginsburg, followed by a dissent from Justices O'Connor, Stevens and Sou-
ter). The majority was satisfied, with the evidence presented, that there were de-
monstrable problems with discipline and drug use that warranted the invasion of
the student's privacy rights. See id. at 663-64. However, an examination of the
supporting evidence required to go forth with drug-testing policies often appears
weak, suspect or nonexistent (one court would go on to approve drug-testing
where there was no drug use issue). Comparably, the evidence in Schaill looks
strong. See generally Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th
Cir. 1988). For a discussion of Schaill, see supra notes 95-106 and accompanying
text. In Schaill, the court allowed drug-testing of not only high school students, but
also those in middle school. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1324. With the erosion of
privacy rights, the evidence relied upon should be exceptionally strong.
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majority opinion; he had previously written the stinging dissent in
Von Raab, which disagreed with the majority decision upholding the
constitutionality of drug-testing of Customs Department employ-
ees.' 34 The operative factor in Vernonia was the age and identity of
the individuals involved. Interscholastic athletes are not entitled to
the same constitutional protection as adults. Overall, the majority
opinion appeared to reflect the application of ends justifying the
means.
First, the Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment ex-
tends Fourth Amendment protection by state officers to public
school officials.1 35 Second, the Fourth Amendment requires a "rea-
sonableness" standard, which may take into account the locus of
the search. 36 The Court stated that "[a]s the text of the Fourth
Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality
of a governmental search is 'reasonableness' .. . which 'is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment in-
terests against its promotion of legitimate governmental inter-
ests."' 37 However, a warrant is not required in every circumstance.
Indeed, the Court stated: "We have found such 'special needs' to
exist in the public school context." 38
Third, the compelling state interest was also employed. 139 In
expounding upon the compelling state interest, the Court stated
that it "describes an interest which appears important enough to jus-
tify the particular search at hand, in light of other factors that show
the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of
privacy."' 40 Furthermore, the Court concluded that "[d] eterring
drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is at least as important as
enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the
134. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 686-87
(1989).
135. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652 (citations omitted).
136. See id. at 654-55.
137. Id. at 652-53 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 619 (1989)).
138. Id. at 653 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985)). For
further discussion of the "special needs" exception, see supra notes 43-44 and ac-
companying text.
139. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (explicating that district court held that
because district's program also called for drug-testing in absence of individualized
suspicion, district must demonstrate compelling need for program).
140. Id. (emphasis added) (holding high degree of governmental concern is
met and nature of concern is important and compelling).
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importation of drugs... [s] chool years are the time when the physi-
cal, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe." 141
Fourth, "[t]he legitimacy of certain privacy expectations vis-A-
vis the state may depend upon the individuals' legal relationship
with the state." 142 The Court stressed the in loco parentis relation-
ship between the school and the student-athletes, and in citing
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent County School District, stated, "the na-
ture of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school." 143
Fifth, privacy interests are reduced for interscholastic student-
athletes.1 44 "Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with re-
gard to student athletes."1 45 Justice Scalia continued: "School
sports are not for the bashful. They require "suiting up" before
each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards.
Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are
not notable for the privacy they afford. 1 4 6
141. Id. (decreeing effects of drug-infested school are visited not just upon
users, but upon entire student body and faculty, as educational process is
disrupted).
142. Id. at 654 (stating what expectations are legitimate varies with context
depending upon whether individual asserting privacy interest is at home, at work,
in car, or in public park).
143. Id. at 656 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. County Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
144. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
145. Id.
146. Id. First, the Court's phraseology, "[s]chool sports are not for the bash-
ful," was rather unusual, as it is certainly not a description associated with athletes
or their endeavors. Second, that the Supreme Court would contemplate justifying
the abridgment of this significant constitutional right based in part on this so-
called locker-room communality is rather shocking. The reliance of the incidental
changing of attire by student-athletes into athletic uniforms or practice attire re-
mains curious, as it is not as if the interscholastic athletes engage in athletic events
without wearing some article or articles of clothing. It did not appear that the
school district offered evidence that the athletes did undress, or actually shower or
use toilet facilities, respectively, without stalls or urinal separations. Should consti-
tutional rights be taken away based on assumptions or surmises rather than specific
proof? Requiring individual proof as to each athlete's hygiene-related behavior
just shows how ludicrous this is (which was probably why it was easier to just skate
over this aspect). Moreover, if a particular school did provide enclosed showers as
well as enclosed toilets, or conversely, the school provided no shower facilities,
would those student-athletes be exempt?
Third, the Court's language smacks of machismo bravado associated with
male athletes, and one wonders whether female athletes were contemplated - es-
pecially where they were swept into this drug-testing oversight regardless of
whether their numbers indicated that female student-athletes were also involved
with disciplinary problems and improper drug use. The majority opinion identi-
fied the coach of men's football and wrestling with observing injuries, which this
coach attributed (presumably without confirmation, as it would have been identi-
fied) to drug use. No coaches of women's teams were mentioned as having any
problem, whether perceived or real, with their athletes. In all of the interscholas-
tic student-athlete drug-testing cases, when drug problems are alleged within the
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The Court further explained that "[b]y choosing to 'go out for the
team,' [student-athletes] voluntarily subject themselves to a degree
of regulation even higher than that imposed on students gener-
ally."' 47 For example, student-athletes are subject to minimum
scholastic grades, insurance requirements, pre-season physical ex-
ams and rules of conduct. "Somewhat like adults who choose to
participate in a 'closely regulated industry,' students who volunta-
rily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions
upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy."'1 48
Sixth, the aspect of student-athletes possibly using any prescrip-
tion drugs was given little consideration. The court surmised that
the school was looking only for drugs, "and not for whether the
student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic."149
Seventh, as to the efficacy of this means for addressing the
problem, the Court noted, "[i] t seems... self-evident that a drug
athletic community, there is a noticeable absence of any identified drug use by
female athletes. So much for gender equity in athletics. See Diane Heckman, Wo-
men & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX 9 U. MiAMi ENT. & SPORTS L.
REv. 1, 36-62 (1992) (discussing federal statute, Title IX of Education Amend-
ments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1996) and its implementing regulations,
including 34 C.F.R. 106.41(c) (2001), which requires educational institutions
which are recipients of federal funds to provide equal opportunity in extracurricu-
lar athletics departments when separate athletic programs are provided for male
and female student-athletes); Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Action
in Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard,
1994 DET. C.L. REV. 953, 958-97 (1994) (same); Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title
IX's 25th Anniversary: Sex Discrimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NovA L. REV.
545, 562-92 (1997) (same); Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological
Twenty-Five Year History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletics, 7
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 391, 391-422 (1997) (discussed throughout).
Aside from the broad brush inclusion, the court then went on to identify:
"The locker rooms in Vernonia are typical: No individual dressing rooms are pro-
vided; shower heads are lined up along a wall, unseparated by any sort of partition
or curtain; not even all the toilet stalls have doors." Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. The
Court did not specify if the aforementioned description fit both the males and
females locker rooms. While this may be typical of boys' high school locker rooms,
it is quite unusual for interscholastic girls' locker rooms to have an open shower
area and doorless toilet stalls. Even the policy herein allowed the female student-
athletes to provide a urine sample within a closed bathroom stall.
Later on in the opinion, the Court noted the restriction of this drug-testing to
only school athletes, "[w]here the risk of immediate physical harm to the drug
user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high." Id. at 661
(emphasis added). It is not known if the use of only male pronouns was inten-
tional or a matter of style.
147. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 658. "The Court also assumed that information about prescription
medications the student was compelled to reveal was kept confidential." Earls v.
Bd. of Educ..of Tecumseh Pub. Sch. Dist., 242 F.3d 1264, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, sub nom. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 509
(Nov. 8, 2001).
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problem largely fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug
use, and of particular danger to athletes, is effectively addressed by
making sure that athletes do not use drugs."'150 Thus, the Court
concluded the search was reasonable and constitutional. 15 1 A ca-
veat was issued that this case involved a public school system, with
the government acting "as guardian and tutor of children entrusted
to its care." 152
Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion stressing that the
only penalty imposed was a suspension from an extracurricular ath-
letic program. 53 Justice O'Connor, a conservative jurist, authored
the dissent with Justices Stevens and Souter in agreement. She ar-
gued that the majority disregarded constitutional history by uphold-
ing a broad search not based on a warrant or suspicion of
wrongdoing. 154 The dissent specifically stated that "[i]n justifying
this result, the Court dispenses with a requirement of individualized
suspicion on considered policy grounds."'155 The dissent distin-
guished past precedent by arguing that an individualized require-
ment of suspicion in past cases was impractical because those cases
dealt with situations where one occurrence of wrongdoing could
injure a great number of people. 1 56
150. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663. See generally Andrew T. Pittman & Mark R.
Slough, Commentary, Drug-testing of High School Student Athletics After Vernonia, 104
EDuc. L. REp. 15 (Dec. 14, 1995) (delineating twelve criteria to be examined in
formulating drug-testing policy for interscholastic athletes).
151. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (taking into account all factors considered:
decreasing expectation of privacy, relative unobtrusiveness of search, and severity
of need met by search).
152. Id. (noting just as when government conducts search in its capacity as
employer, relevant question is whether that intrusion upon privacy is one that rea-
sonable employer might engage in, so also when government acts as guardian and
tutor, relevant question is whether search is one that reasonable guardian and tu-
tor might undertake).
153. See id. at 666 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
154. See id. at 667-68 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting). Justice O'Connor pointed to
the Court's viewpoint in Carroll v. United States that "blanket searches are 'intolera-
ble and unreasonable.'" Id. at 669 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,
147-54 (1925)). She further agreed that the "[p]rotection of privacy, not even-
handedness, was then and is now the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
at 671. She also pointed to Justice Scalia's dissent in Von Raab, by stating that
"state-compelled, state-monitored collection and testing of urine, while perhaps
not the most intrusive of searches ... is still 'particularly destructive of privacy and
offensive to personal dignity."' Id. at 672 (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
155. Id. at 667 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 675-76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Subsequently, in Chandler v.
Miller, the Supreme Court used Vernonia to determine whether a Georgia statute,
requiring individuals running for state office to certify that he or she has tested
negative for illegal drugs, violated the Fourth Amendment. See 503 U.S. 305, 314-
17, 322 (1997). The Court stated:
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C. On Remand
On remand the Ninth Circuit, in a split decision, determined
the final issue whether the Oregon State Constitution would pro-
vide a differing search and seizure standard, because the Supreme
Court only dealt with the federal constitutional issue. 157 On Sep-
tember 15, 1995, this court affirmed the judgment of the district
court in finding "the Oregon Supreme Court would not offer
greater protection under the provisions of the Oregon Constitution
....,"58 Judge Reinhardt issued a strong dissent, criticizing the
cursory majority opinion and highlighting his views in this area.159
The dissent summarized the three options the court had: (a) "con-
duct a serious analysis of the question of whether or not random,
suspicionless drug tests violate Article I, Section 9 of the Oregon
Constitution[;]" (b) "certify [the] question to the Oregon Supreme
Court[;]" or, (c) "throw up [the court's] hands and simply pro-
claim that random, suspicionless drug tests are consistent with the
Oregon Constitution as well."1 60 The dissent believed the majority
had chosen the least desirable alternative.1 6'
[I]n Vernonia, the Court sustained a random drug-testing program for
high school students engaged in interscholastic athletic competitions.
The program's context was critical, for a local government bears large
"responsibilites, under a public school system, as guardian and tudor of
children entrusted to its care" . . . . We emphasized the importance of
deterring drug use by schoolchildren and the risk of injury a drug-using
student athlete cast on himself and those engaged with him on the play-
ing field.
Id. at 316-17 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665).
157. See Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 66 F.3d 217, 218 (9th Cir. 1995).
158. Id. at 218.
159. See id. at 218-20 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 219 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
161. See id. The dissent noted in the court's earlier opinion that "[i]t is highly
likely that it will be found to offer more protection" and, "[t] he majority cite [d] no
intervening Oregon case law to explain its swift and total capitulation on this issue,
nor does it explain what, if any, reasoning underlie[d] its conclusion." Vernonia,
66 F.3d at 219 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded, "I see no reason
to presume that Oregon courts will follow our recent federal practice of shrinking
constitutional rights or to assume that Oregon's courts will not continue vigilantly
to protect Oregonians' rights under the state constitution .... I am not prepared
to say that the Oregon Supreme Court will decide that the rights of its school
children must be shaped by the national frenzy over the war-on-drugs. To the
contrary, given its history of rugged individualism and its concern for constitu-
tional rights, Oregon might well opt for a more generous and enlightened reading
of its constitution." Id. at 219-20 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
243
35
Heckman: The Evolution of Drug Testing of Interscholastic Athletes
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2002
244 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
IX. POST-VERNONIA DECISIONS
A. Circuit Court Decisions
In recent years, the Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits have addressed the general issue of student searches, with
mixed results. In Moule v. Paradise Valley Unified School District No.
69,162 for example, an Arizona federal district court ruled in 1994
that the random drug-testing of interscholastic athletes violated the
Fourth Amendment. The court noted that while certain adminis-
trative searches of employees are warranted, testing student athletes
is "not a case 'fraught with danger' involving persons with attenu-
ated interests in privacy." 163 The court also noted that under the
totality of the circumstances, the consent was not truly voluntary.164
On appeal, in a decision rendered after the Supreme Court's in
Vernonia, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's
determination. 65
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit Court in Todd v. Rush County
Schools1 66 upheld an Indiana school district's random, suspicionless
162. 863 F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (D. Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 335 (9th Cir.
1995). But see B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1268 (9th Cir.
1999) (finding random dog sniffing of students for drugs without any level of sus-
picion constituted unreasonable search).
163. Moule, 863 F. Supp. at 1102 (recognizing student athletes not subject to
extensive government regulation and not dependent on role as athlete).
164. Id. at 1103 (finding student barred from participation without signed
consent form is coercion for constitutional purposes).
165. See Moule, 66 F.3d 335 (listing Ninth Circuit decisions issued without pub-
lished opinions).
166. 983 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Ind. 1997), affd, 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998),
reh'gen banc denied, 139 F.3d 571 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998);
see alsoJoy v. Penn-Harris Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1067 (7th Cir. 2000)
(upholding random drug-testing for drugs, alcohol and tobacco for all students
driving to school and those involved in extracurricular activities including inter-
scholastic athletics). Herein, the school district's goal was to subject all students to
random testing. See Joy, 212 F.3d at 1055. The Seventh Circuit highlighted: "The
danger of the slippery slope continues to haunt our jurisprudence." Id. at 1066.
Interestingly, the policy called for all students involved with extracurricular activi-
ties to attend at least one drug education session before beginning the activity. See
id. at 1055. The court recognized that "[t] he district is attempting to do what this
court in Willis admonished against: dividing the students into broad categories and
drug-testing on a category-by-category basis, which allows for drug-testing for all
but the most uninvolved and isolated students." Id. at 1064. "With the mass exit of
students after classes into the relatively close confines of a student parking lot, one
student under the influence of drugs or alcohol could cause serious injury or
death." Id. However, the court was less comfortable with the testing of eighteen-
year-old students for tobacco, which the district court allowed. See id. at 1064. This
panel felt constrained to follow the earlier Seventh Circuit decision in Todd. See id.
at 1066. However "[t]he court made it clear that, were it not so bound, it would
find the policy unconstitutional under a careful and thorough application of the
Vernonia factors." Id.
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drug-testing policy for students seeking to participate in any extra-
curricular activity. "This was a change from its precatory language
used in SchailL' 67 After the Vernonia and Chandler decisions, the
Indiana district court upheld a random drug-testing program of all
students who wanted to participate in any extracurricular activi-
ties. 168 The program was modeled after the one in Vernonia, al-
though the empirical data used to substantiate the need for the
program in the first instance was demonstrably weak.' 69 Under the
program, students were required to obtain parental consent to con-
duct random testing for drugs, alcohol or tobacco. 170 The drugs
included "amphetamines, barbiturates, benzodiazepines (such as
Valium and Librium), cocaine, opiates, PCP, marijuana, alcohol
and nicotine.' 7  Steroids were not included. 17 2 The high school
contracted a private company to do the testing.' 73 Two tests were
applied: first the EMIT test, and if positive, then the sample was
retested using the gas chromatography test.174 There was no visual
observation during the actual providing of the urine sample. 75 In-
stead of issuing a specific time-frame penalty, the policy detailed
that any student found positive would be barred from extracurricu-
lar activities until they passed a retest.' 76 A student barred from
extracurricular activities, however, would have to wait to be tested
until that private company came back to the school, which could be
167. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 984; see also Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
168. See Todd, 983 F. Supp. at 806.
169. See id. at 804-05. The high school had 950 students. See id. at 801. Dur-
ing the 1996-97 academic year, before implementation of the drug-testing policy,
thirty students were suspended for improper use of alcohol, tobacco or drugs or
for being arrested. See id. However, most of these suspensions were due to tobacco
or alcohol. See id. The exact figure attributed to drug use was not identified. See
id. The athletic director believed there was a growing problem with drugs at the
school. See id.
170. See id. at 801.
171. Id. at 802 (detailing testing is done on EMIT instrument which has accu-
racy rate of greater than ninety five percent). "The tested-for substances all have
different detection periods, ranging from alcohol, which leaves the body in a mat-
ter of hours, to marijuana, which may take up to thirty days." Id.
172. See id.
173. See Todd, 983 F. Supp. at 800.
174. See id. at 802 (recognizing use of gas chromatography test has better than
ninety-nine percent accuracy).
175. See id. (conveying that students are supervised at all times except for time
they are in private area).
176. See id. (communicating that if test result is positive, student and family
are informed and given opportunity to explain the result to school principal; but
without sanctioned explanation, student is barred from extracurricular activities).
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a year later. 177 The court emphasized the fact that there was "mini-
mal" public opposition to the plan for drug-testing. 178 The district
court cited the "special needs" allowance the Supreme Court estab-
lished in Chandler.179 The court also distinguished the program in
Vernonia from this one.180 Ultimately, the court validated the
program.' 8'
The Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the pro-
gram in 1998, finding that the drug-testing program was consistent
with the Fourth Amendment.182 It noted that "[c]ertainly success-
ful extracurricular activities requires healthy students."' 8 3  Of
course, the next step is to require random drug-testing of all stu-
dents, under the guise that healthy children certainly make success-
ful students. In the en banc hearing, the dissenting opinion,
concerning the denial of the students' request, stated that
"[b] ecause of the broad-brushed reading of Vernonia embraced by
the panel, its decision takes us a long way toward condoning drug-
177. See id. (explaining retest is at school's expense, while any subsequent test-
ing would be charged to student; however, positive result on retest results in con-
tinuing prohibition from participation in extracurricular activities until student
tests negative).
178. See Todd, 983 F. Supp. at 801.
179. See id. at 804.
180. See id. at 805. The court stated: "The Program in this case is essentially
identical to the one in Vernonia, with one key difference: the program applies to all
extracurricular activities, not just athletics." Id.
181. See id. at 806. The court found "[tl here is no minimum triggering point
of substance abuse (such as ten percent or fifty percent of the student population)
that must be met to justify the 'important enough' interest on the part of the
school system discussed in Vernonia." Id. at 806. The court concluded: "In the end,
however, any perceived differences between the student athletes in Vernonia and
the non-athlete extracurricular participants in this case turn out to be more ethe-
real than real... extracurricular activities, like sports, are voluntary activities which
submit the students to extra rules and regulations." Id.
182. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986; see also Bridgman v. New Trier High Sch. Dist.
No. 203, 128 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (relying on T.L.O. standard and hold-
ing school officials not required to establish probable cause to justify search of
student suspected of using marijuana). While attending an after-school smoking
cessation program, a female classroom teacher observed that the student had
bloodshot eyes and diluted pupils. See Bridgman, 128 F.3d at 1147. The teacher
ordered the male freshman student to the nurse's office for a medical assessment.
See id. at 1148. The nurse took the student's pulse and blood pressure and he was
told to remove his jersey and hat, which he did. See id. The Seventh Circuit stated:
"Because of the special circumstances of the school context, however, school offi-
cials need not demonstrate the existence of probable cause in order to justify a
search of a student's person or property." Id. at 1149. "[T]he question is whether
the [teacher's] actions in ordering the medical assessment and then searching
[the student's] clothing were reasonable .... The symptoms were sufficient to
ground [the teacher's] suspicion, and the medical assessment was reasonably cal-
culated to uncover further evidence of the suspected drug use." Id. at 1149.
183. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
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testing in the general school population."' 184 The dissent added:
"The principal reason given for permitting this program - that the
demands of extracurricular activities require healthy students - is as
true for scholastic matters as it is for extracurricular activities. '185
The dissent felt that the panel opinion left the jurisprudence with-
out a guiding principle to protect against these general searches.186
However, the Seventh Circuit in Willis v. Anderson Community
School Corp. 187 found that where there was no individual suspicion, a
drug-testing policy requiring students involved in fights to undergo
urinalysis when they returned to school transgressed permissible
searches.18 8 The court rejected the conclusive presumption that
fighting alone rendered reasonable suspicion of drug use.18 9 The
court cited Vernonia, which "explained that the reasonableness of a
suspicionless search depends upon the balance between (A) the na-
ture of the individual's privacy interest and the character of the in-
trusion, and (B) the nature and immediacy of the government's
concern, as well as the efficacy of the means for meeting that con-
cern."' 90 Then, the court distinguished fighting from voluntarily
engaging in extracurricular athletic activities.' 91
In Miller v. Wilkes, 192 the Eighth Circuit upheld the random
drug-testing of all students in grades seven through twelve, even
where there was no history of drug use.' 93 Failure to execute a con-
sent form would result in the student being disallowed from partici-
pating in any extracurricular activity.194 A new wrinkle was
introduced, whereby any positive test results were to be destroyed
upon a student's graduation or two years after the termination of
enrollment in the school.19 5 The Eighth Circuit emphasized that
"[t] he Supreme Court has held that the public school environment
184. Todd, 139 F.3d 571, 573 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
185. See id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
186. See id. (Ripple, J., dissenting).
187. 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1019 (1999). But see
Joy v. Penn-Harris Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1065 (7th Cir. 2000) (up-
holding random drug-testing for all extracurricular activity participants and stu-
dents driving to school).
188. See Willis, 158 F.3d at 425.
189. See id. at 419.
190. Id. at 421 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 654, 658
(1995)).
191. See id. at 422.
192. 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999).
193. See id. at 581.
194. See id. at 576-77 (conveying that students shall not be allowed to partici-
pate in any school activity where student or parent refuses to give written consent).
195. See id.
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provides the requisite 'special needs' so that a school district may
dispense with those Fourth Amendment protections.' 196 This court
jumped from the presumptively minimal privacy aspects for athletes
accustomed to communal undress in locker rooms, to extending
the syllogism that because all public students are subject to require-
ments for physical examinations, vaccinations against disease, and
screenings for hearing and vision loss, that such routine physical
examinations open the door to unfettered searches. 97 This appel-
late court underscored: "We see no reason that a school district
should be compelled to wait until there is a demonstrable problem
with substance abuse among its own students before the district is
constitutionally permitted to take measures that will help protect its
schools against the sort of 'rebellion' proven in Vernonia ....
The Third Circuit in Hedges v. Musco' 99 upheld a drug test of a
student subject to individual suspicion of drug use, who was first
ushered to the nurse's office and then subject to blood and urine
tests at a doctor's office. 200 The court underscored the mere fact
that there are less intrusive means of ascertaining whether a student
has consumed alcohol, and though perhaps probative, it is not dis-
positive of the reasonableness of the search. 20 1 Students filed an
appeal during 2000 seeking a decision by the Fifth Circuit.20 2
B. Other Decisions
On March 1, 2001, a Texas federal district court in Tannahill v.
Lockney Independent School District203 found that a school district's
196. Id. at 578 (indicating in certain limited circumstances, government's
need to discover hidden and hazardous conditions, or to prevent their develop-
ment, is sufficiently compelling to justify intrusion on privacy by conducting
searches without any measure of individualized suspicion).
197. See Wilkes, 172 F.3d at 579.
198. Id. at 581.
199. 204 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2000).
200. See id. at 113-14, 117.
201. See id. at 120.
202. See Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:97-CV-020-J, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20252, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2000) (ruling that drug-testing scheme of all
students involved with extracurricular activities was unconstitutional), appeal filed
(5th Cir. Dec. 7, 2000) (decision outstanding as of March 15, 2002); see also Tan-
nahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. 1, 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 931 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (find-
ing policy covering all students unconstitutional); Brooks v. E. Chambers Consol.
Indep. Sch., 730 F. Supp. 759, 760-62 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.
1991) (pre-Vernonia decision discussing another Texas school district drug-testing
policy).
203. 133 F. Supp. 2d 919 (N.D. Tex. 2001). The court relied on Brooks, which
concerned random drug-testing without any degree of suspicion of those students
participating in extracurricular activities. But see Stockton v. City of Freeport, 147
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policy allowing mandatory suspicionless drug-testing of all students
reaching down into the sixth grade violated the students' Fourth
Amendment rights. 20 4 In this case, the failure of a parent to con-
sent to the test on behalf of the child would be deemed a positive
test, which would result in exclusion from participation in any ex-
tracurricular activities for a period of twenty-one days and a school
suspension of three days. 20 5 Additionally, the policy called for esca-
lating punishment.20 6 All parents signed the consent forms, except
for the plaintiff's parents.20 7 Eleven of 400 students tested positive
for marijuana use.208 After the completion of the first academic
year of the policy's existence, the school district amended the pol-
icy to exclude sixth-grade students, who were part of the junior
high school.209 Specifically, the court found that the school district
failed to establish that "special needs" warranted the broad intru-
sion, and that there was no "immediate crisis" as found by the Su-
preme Court in Vernonia.210 The court further indicated that the
privacy expectations of these students were higher, compared to in-
terscholastic athletes, who were at the center of the Vernonia opin-
ion. 211 While the court noted that the intrusion of urinalysis testing
F. Supp. 2d 642, 646 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (giving "little heed" to Tannahill decision
due to dissimilarities between the cases).
204. See id. at 924-31.
205. See Tannahill 133 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (identifying continued refusal of
parent to consent to child's being tested for drugs would, as with continued posi-
tive test results, result in escalation of punishments, up to placing child in alterna-
tive school and disqualifying him from participating in any activity or receiving any
honors for year-period).
206. See id. at 923.
207. See id.
208. See id. (identifying no students have tested positive for alcohol or any
other drugs).
209. See id. (noting that rather than treating refusal to consent to drug test
same as positive test result, consequence for refusing to consent to drug test results
in removal from participation in all extracurricular activities until participation in
drug-testing program).
210. See Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 924.
[T]his court finds that two methods of establishing "special needs" have
evolved. On the one hand, special needs can be shown in instances, as in
Skinner, Von Raab and Aubrey, when the individual subject to the test per-
forms highly regulated functions concerning the public safety or special
governmental roles. On the other hand, a school district can prove the
existence of a special need by showing exigent circumstances and contin-
ued failure in attempts to alleviate the probe. Furthermore, numerous
cases have also made it clear that general concerns about maintaining
drug-free schools or desires to detect legal conduct are insufficient as a
matter of law to demonstrate the existence of special needs.
Id. at 928 (internal citations omitted).
211. See id. at 929.
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was minimal; the school district failed to show a compelling state
interest.2 12
In Trinidad School District No. 1 v. Lopez,2 13 the Colorado Su-
preme Court struck down a drug-testing program for all sixth
through twelfth grade students participating in extracurricular ac-
tivities.2 14 This case involved a member of the marching band who
refused to execute a consent form.2 1 5 The high school senior could
not pass a for-credit music course without also participating in the
school marching band. 21 6 The policy at issue required the student
to successfully complete an annual drug test before participating in
the first event of that extracurricular activity. 217 The student was
also required to disclose to school officials the use of any prescrip-
tion medication.2 1 8 Although students were required to attend
physical education classes, they were not required to shower; thus,
there was no evidence of diminished expectations of privacy among
the student body at-large based on participation in physical educa-
tion classes.2 19
Conversely, on March 5, 2002, the Indiana Supreme Court in
Linke v. Northwestern School Corp., 220 upheld, pursuant to the Indiana
Constitution, the drug-testing program of interscholastic athletes,
certain extracurricular participants and students who drive to
school. 221 In two more recent cases, student-athletes lost their ath-
letic eligibility for violating drug and alcohol policies based on in-
212. See id. "Attending school is not akin to participation in a highly regu-
lated industry as is the work place for railway employees, customs agents, residents
who practice medicine or even elementary school custodians. Moreover, the aca-
demic studies of a student, while very important, do not embody the immediate
and severe life and death repercussions as do the decisions of these employees."
Id. at 930.
213. 963 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1998) (concerning student suspended from high
school marching band for refusal to submit to suspicionless drug test who sued
school district and various district employees for injunctive and declaratory relief
on ground that testing policy violated Fourth Amendment).
214. See id. at 1110 (holding school policy unconstitutional in light of
Vernonia).
215. See id. at 1097.
216. See id. (describing student's suspension from band classes and marching
band).
217. See id.
218. See Lopez, 963 P.2d at 1098.
219. See id. at 1103. "[W]e view the absence of voluntariness and the qualita-
tively different type of undressing in this case as significant." Id.
220. 734 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding unconstitutional random
suspicionless drug-testing policies of students involved with extracurricular activi-
ties, and referring to the "special needs" analysis), rev'd, 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind.
2002).
221. See id. at 260.
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formation reported by the police to school officials. 222
Additionally, in United States v. Salmiento,223 a federal district court
upheld the constitutionality of the Drug Free School Zones Act of
1984.224
As of 1996, it was reported that "[n]o state has instituted state-
wide random drug-testing of high school athletes, according to the
National Federation of State High School Associations. '" 225 How-
ever, the Attorney General for the State of Alabama proposed that
certain funds received from a settlement in an unrelated case be
allocated for random drug tests for steroids and other drugs in the
state's high schools.226 During his second presidential campaign,
President William J. Clinton issued a proposal calling for drug-test-
ing of all teenagers in order to receive a driver's license, which
222. See Butler v. Oak Creek-Franklin Sch. Dist., 116 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1041
(E.D. Wis. 2000) (noting school issued one-year suspension from interscholastic
athletics where school district relied on confidential police report); see alsoJordan
ex rel. Edwards v. O'Fallon Township High Sch. Dist. No. 203 Bd. of Educ., 706
N.E.2d 137, 138 (Ill. 1999) (explaining school district withheld athletic eligibility
of high school football player as punishment for violating school's zero tolerance
alcohol and drug policy). Police reported student's alleged use of alcohol to the
school. See Edwards, 706 N.E.2d at 139. The student was found at three a.m. one
morning standing in a parking lot. See id. The lack of a formal hearing did not
violate Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process. See id. at 143. Moreover,
the possibility of a college scholarship did not rise to a property interest. See id. at
141.
223. 898 F. Supp. 45 (D. P.R. 1995), affid, sub nom. United States v. Zorilla, 93
F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1996); see also State v. Prosper, 910 P.2d 859, 861 (Kan. App. 1996)
(concerning sale of drugs within 1,000 feet of school property which violates Drug-
Free School Zone Act). See generally United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Walker v. State, 668 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. 1996) (concerning sale of cocaine
within 1,000 feet of school); State v. Byrd, 922 P.2d 168 (Wash. App. 1996). There
is also a federal statute known as the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities
Act of 1994. 20 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7165. (1994). The Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Program consists of two major programs: State Grants for Drug and Violence Pre-
vention Programs, and National Programs. State Grants is a formula grant pro-
gram that provides funds to state and local education agencies, as well as
governors, for a wide range of school and community-based education and preven-
tion activities. National Programs carries out a variety of discretionary initiatives
that respond to emerging needs. Among these are direct grants to school districts
and communities with drug and anti-violence programs, as well as program evalua-
tions, information development and dissemination. See http://www.ed.gov/of-
fices/OESE/SDFS/aboutsdf.html (visited Aug. 5, 2001) (listing "Drug Abuse
Prevention Internet Resources" indicated on the Department of Education's web
site). During 1995, the United States Naval Academy ordered urine tests for all
midshipmen after two students were allegedly caught with LSD.
224. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1984) (describing penalty for drug distribution in or
near schools and colleges).
225. Alabama Official Proposes Drug-testing in High School, NCAA NEws, Apr. 22,
1996, at 3.
226. See id.
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would have been an announced test. 227 No action was taken on
this measure during the second term of the Clinton administration.
However, in 1998, an Arizona bill was introduced to permit "school
districts to adopt drug-testing guidelines for high school students
who participate in interscholastic athletics."228
X. TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN EARLS V. BoARD OF EDUCATION
OF TECUMSEH PUBLIC SCHOOL
A. Tenth Circuit Rejects Drug-testing of All
Extracurricular Students
Approximately ten percent of all United States residents, or
23.7 million students, are at risk for random suspicionless drug-test-
ing based on the Supreme Court's determination of the next
case. 2 29 On March 21, 2001, the Tenth Circuit in Earls v. Board of
Education230 rejected a drug-testing policy for all students participat-
ing in all extracurricular activities (including choir, band, color
guard, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of
America, interscholastic athletics and cheerleading). The court
found that illegal drug use at an Oklahoma high school in a rela-
tively small town was negligible and the policy did not effectively
address the school's claimed safety and supervision concerns. 231
The policy tested for amphetamines, marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
barbiturates and benzodiazepines, but not for steroids, alcohol or
nicotine. 232 While the policy pertained to students engaged in all
extracurricular activities, it was applied only to those engaged in
227. See Clinton Urges Drug-Testing Plan for Youths, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at
1, 18.
228. State Legislation Relating to Student-Athletes, NCAA NEws, June 1, 1998, at 5.
The bill "[r]equires the drug test be used only to detect illegal drug use and not
medical conditions." Id. Also, it " [a] llows for the release of drug test results to
school personnel and the parent or guardian of the student." Id.
229. Brief of Respondent (Feb. 6, 2002), Summary of Argument, at 8; http://
www.aclu.org/court/earls.pdf.
230. 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, sub nom. Bd. of Educ.
of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 92 S. Ct. 122 (Nov. 8, 2001) (Solicitor General
for George W. Bush Administration has filed an amicus brief supporting the broad
drug-testing regime).
231. See id.; see also Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 761 A.2d 652, 653 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000) (covering those involved with extracurricular activities and stu-
dents who drove motor vehicles to school). This Theodore state court stated: "[W]e
disagree that just by exercising a privilege in any activity that is part of the educa-
tional process, a student's privacy interests are lessened and that a school district
can, without more, condition participation in that activity on agreeing to testing
just because those activities are optional." Id. at 660.
232. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1267 (describing detection of substances through
drug-testing).
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competitive activities that were sanctioned by the Oklahoma Secon-
dary Schools Activity Association.233 The students were also re-
quired to disclose any medication being taken, which was not
subject to review by the teacher-monitors at the time of the testing.
This disclosure form was then to be placed in a sealed envelope. 234
Lindsey Earls, a member of the high school choir and participant in
an academic quiz team, responded to the undertaking of an urinal-
ysis test that came back negative: "It was horrible. Someone would
stand outside the bathroom stall and listen."235 The actual collec-
tion process was handled by school teachers, with whom the stu-
dents could be coming in daily contact with, as opposed to a
medically trained individual.2 36
The Tenth Circuit discussed the "special needs" test and its in-
terpretation in prior Supreme Court decisions, and determined
that "special needs" required a two-step analysis: (1) whether the
government has established the existence of a special need to re-
quire the drug-testing; and, (2) whether the government interest
outweighs the citizen's privacy interest.23 7 As to the first prong, the
inquiry would be "whether the testing program was adopted in re-
sponse to a documented drug abuse problem or whether drug
abuse among the target group would pose a serious danger to the
233. See id.
234. See id. at 1268 (explaining results of drug tests were placed in confiden-
tial files separate from students' other educational files and were disclosed only to
those school personnel who have need to know, and would not be turned over to
any law enforcement authorities). The respondents also questioned the protec-
tion by the school of privacy concerns. "For example, the Choir teacher looked at
students' prescription drug lists and left them where other students could see
them .... The results of a positive drug test, too, were disseminated to as many as
thirteen faculty members at a time .... and these test results generally became
known to other students [when] suddenly [a student] was suspended from his or
her activities shortly after administration of a drug test." Brief of Respondent (Feb.
6, 2002) (statement of the case), at http://www.aclu.org/court/earls.pdf.
235. Associated Press, Court Takes SchoolDrug-Test Case, NEWSDAY, Nov. 9, 2001,
at A35. Earls is presently a student at Dartmouth College, an Ivy League school.
236. "When [Earls] emerged from the stall, Lindsay was required to watch as
one of her teachers took the vial in hand, feeling Lindsay's urine sample to ensure
that it was the proper temperature and holding Lindsay's urine up in the light to
inspect its color and clarity .... This collection and close examination of bodily
fluid by a teacher whom Lindsay would regularly see at school is hardly equivalent,
as the School maintains, to the normal process of using a public restroom." Brief
of Respondent (Feb. 6, 2002) (statement of the case) http://www.aclu.org/court/
earls.pdf.
237. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1269 (identifying development of "special needs"
doctrine).
253
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public."238 In this case, the court found "that the evidence of drug
use among those subject to the Policy [was] far from the 'epidemic'
and 'immediate crisis' faced by the Vernonia schools and empha-
sized by the Supreme Court's opinion .... Rather, the evidence of
actual drug usage, particularly among the tested students, [was]
minimal .... "239 The court expressed "that [it doubted] the Court
intend[ed] that the level of privacy expectation depends upon the
degree to which particular students, or groups of students, dress or
shower together or, on occasion, share sleeping or bathroom facili-
ties while on occasional out-of-town trips."240
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that it did not believe
"voluntary participation in an activity, without more, should reduce
a student's expectation of privacy in his or her body."241 Nonethe-
less, the court found that privacy interests were lessened.242 How-
ever, when the court considered the efficacy of the solution, by
featuring across-the-board testing, the balance tipped in the stu-
dent's favor. The court discussed that "safety cannot be the sole
justification for testing all students in competitive extracurricular
activities, because the Policy, from a safety perspective, tests both
too many students and too few. In essence, it too often simply tests
the wrong students."243 The court also questioned the validity of
the school's supervision claims. 244 In conclusion, the court an-
nounced that "any district seeking to impose a random suspi-
cionless drug-testing policy as a condition to participation in a
school activity must demonstrate that there is some identifiable
drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to
the testing, such that testing that group of students will actually re-
dress its drug problem. '" 245
238. Id. at 1270 n.4 (acknowledging even without documented drug abuse
problem, potential danger of drug abuse among target group may be sufficient to
establish existence of special need).
239. Id. at 1272.
240. Id. at 1275.
241. Id. at 1276. "Moreover, while participation in extracurricular activities is
voluntary, such participation has become an integral part of the educational expe-
rience for most students .... Thus, the voluntariness of the participation, without
more, does not reduce a student's expectation of privacy." Id.
242. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276.
243. Id. at 1277.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1278.
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B. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear the Appeal
On August 24, 2001, the school district filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari seeking review by the Supreme Court, which the
Supreme Court granted during November 2001.246 The brief sub-
mitted on behalf of the students, who are being represented by the
ACLU, set forth three main arguments:
(1) searches in the school context, including urinalysis
drug-testing, must presumptively be based upon individu-
alized reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing; (2) the dis-
trict's drug-testing policy, which imposes an intrusive
search and seizure of urine upon non-athletes with no his-
tory of drug use who engage in no dangerous activities,
does not meet the Vernonia special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment's standard of individualized reasona-
ble suspicion; and (3) the school's call for clear guidance
in designing drug-testing regimes does not justify aban-
doning the Fourth Amendment protection against general
searches.
24 7
The respondents identified the significant role that participation in
extracurricular activities yields, not only the benefits incurred by
the actual participation, but also the significant role such participa-
tion plays in the college admission process. The respondents com-
mented on the attempt by the school district to envelope possible
tumbling off stages by choir members and colliding on the march-
ing fields by band members as safety concerns to trump their consti-
tutional rights as "contrived and speculative,"' 24 8 as opposed to
"dangerous sports like football."24 9 The respondents stressed: "If
forfeiting one's constitutional rights becomes the price for partici-
246. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 92 S. Ct. 122 (2001)
(oral argument scheduled for March 19, 2002) (rendering a non-unanimous deci-
sion, which conflicted with other circuit opinions). Justice Ginsburg was not a
member of the Court when it issued the Vernonia decision.
247. Brief of Respondent (Feb. 6, 2002) (argument); http://www.aclu.org/
court/earls.pdf. The respondents argued:
"Given the careful line drawn by the Court in Vernonia, the School is sim-
ply wrong to assume that a broader license was implied. This is not a case
about student athletes. It is a case about students who engage in extra-
curricular activities that do not present any special risk of physical injury
in a school district that has consistently denied any significant drug
problem."
Id. Summary of argument, at 8.
248. Id. (Statement of the case).
249. Id. Interestingly, the brief seems to concede the propriety of drug-test-
ing of interscholastic athletes, rather than raising concerns at the underlying ratio-
nale used to prop up drug-testing of this segment of students. Equally disturbing is
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pating in any activity beyond legally compelled classroom attend-
ance, then only the most withdrawn and uninvolved students will
enjoy the protection of the Bill of Rights." 250
The strongest factor favoring the school is the Supreme
Court's prior willingness to condone drug-testing of certain public
students; albeit herein the entire group are arguably not role mod-
els (since that designation has been relegated to the student-ath-
letes). These students, however, do not engage in communal
undress and showering or it is incidental; and any "regulations" im-
posed by the schools toward them while important to the parties
involved, are incidental. The Supreme Court's decision should be
rendered by the conclusion of the current term.
XI. CONCLUSION
In June 1995, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Vernonia,
upholding random urinalysis drug-testing of high school interscho-
lastic athletes where evidence of drug use had been assigned to the
targeted class. Ironically, drug-testing policies for professional ath-
letes - who may receive millions of dollars and whose owners de-
sire them to be in optimal condition to perform - are circumspect
when testing may occur, especially for veterans, and especially as it
concerns random suspicionless testing as opposed to announced
tests. While concerned with the health and safety of student-ath-
letes, the choice of drugs selected on the interscholastic level is also
curious as none of the policies reviewed herein prohibited steroids
or other illegal performance-enhancing drugs or procedures, as op-
posed to those deemed recreational drugs. Additionally, alcohol is
perhaps the most serious problem confronting high school stu-
dents nationally; however, urinalysis is an ineffective procedure for
detecting alcohol use.25 1 Recreational drugs, such as marijuana,
are included routinely. This issue becomes more complex if public
schools start prohibiting legal substances that are being used as per-
formance-enhancers. Urinalysis is deemed a minimal invasion of
privacy; however, perhaps courts will approve blood tests, which
clearly are more accurate but more invasive. At least one court al-
lowed such a blood test, albeit in a case where there was individual
suspicion and where only alcohol was involved.
the respondent's contention that the school district is automatically grouping
cheerleading as an athletic activity. Id. (Statement of the case) at n.2.
250. Id.
251. See Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.3d 1309, 1321 n.17
(7th Cir. 1988).
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The use of random suspicionless drug-testing of interscholastic
athletes may have a profound effect on preventing or reducing
drug use by this group, and thus, the net result is clearly favorable.
It is significant to see if the policies, such as tracking the results of
the drug-testing in Vernonia, have had the intended effect. Moreo-
ver, once these plans are in place, there appears to be no end date.
When does the evidence used to justify these policies become stale?
May these policies continue in perpetuity? In addition, are the
courts scrutinizing the evidence offered, by the proponent school
officials who claim a drug problem exists, to judicially mandate
such drug-testing? Should interscholastic female student-athletes
automatically be covered where there is no foundation of their
drug use?
Two factors used by the Supreme Court stand out: (a) the ra-
tionale that incidental communal undress or showering can be
equated with diminished privacy so as to uphold urinalysis, al-
though it is irrelevant to the essence of athletics, and no foundation
was established that all of the athletes targeted had in fact engaged
in such activity; and (b) the reasoning that interscholastic athletes
are subject to greater regulations, and thus, urinalysis could be
sanctioned. Remarkably, one state court distinguished that because
students were not subject to mandatory showering in conjunction
with their physical education classes, band members would be ex-
cluded from drug-testing, demonstrating the absurdity of the first
aspect. The latter aspect can be used to condone drug-testing of
practically all educational activities. In fact, this element was used
to extend drug-testing of interscholastic athletes (and sometimes
cheerleaders) to participants in all extracurricular activities. The
next step was of course to extend the border further by testing all
students in high schools and even junior high schools or middle
schools as low as the sixth grade. The first aspect that was empha-
sized by the Supreme Court has been omitted altogether by other
courts allowing testing of all extracurricular students (where clearly
all these students were not engaging in communal undress and
showering in conjunction with their after-school activities). Thus, if
the essential element is only that the individual be involved in a
highly regulated enterprise - such as the Court condoned with
interscholastic athletics - it could be argued that there are few
endeavors in this country outside those parameters. Minor-age stu-
dents, who may be subject to certain academic and athletic criteria
to participate in interscholastic athletics, are far afield from those
adult employees who are involved with ensuring national defense,
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or the national, state and local safety of the citizens, or involved
with atomic or nuclear-related concerns. The two factors employed
seem disingenuous, in an attempt to reach a desired societal goal as
opposed to a sound legal conclusion pertaining to abridgment of
Fourth Amendment rights.
As the Twentieth Century ended, overall the circuit courts
were willing to dramatically push the envelope on approving drug-
testing of an overwhelming number of minors in this country. This
was not only for interscholastic athletes as found by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Moule;, but also for participants of all extracurricular activi-
ties as indicated by the Seventh Circuit in Todd; or of all students in
grades seven to twelve even where there was no evidence of drug
use as demonstrated by the Eighth Circuit in Miller; or of students
who drive to school as shown by the Seventh Circuit in Joy; or al-
lowing a blood test for suspected alcohol use as shown by the Third
Circuit in Hedges. Conversely, as the Twenty-first Century has com-
menced, there has been a pendulum swing restricting such broad
policies as evidenced by the Tenth Circuit in Earls. As the appellate
court stated in Earls, "[u]nless a [school] district is required to
demonstrate such a problem, there is no limit on what students a
school may randomly and without suspicion test. Without any limi-
tation, schools could test all of their students simply as a condition
of attending school."252
The Supreme Court decision in Earls will either stop the
hemorrhaging of student's constitutional rights based on participa-
tion in extracurricular activities or signal that they are fair game for
drug-testing for any number of substances, and opening the flood-
gates to universal drug-testing of any public school students. Of
course, when the Supreme Court articulated its influential 1969
Tinker decision that students do not shed their rights at the school
doors, it is doubtful that the Court contemplated that students
would be literally forced to partially disrobe and urinate in front of
viewing teachers and coaches, that they may come in daily contact
with during their school days, as opposed to medically-trained indi-
viduals. It is equally doubtful that our forefathers ever envisioned
their children being subject to such activity when forming this
country. As Justice Brandeis, in the oft-repeated sentiment re-
corded in his dissent in Olmstead v. United States,253 stated: "[t]he
makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the Govern-
ment, the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights
252. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1278.
253. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
[Vol. 9: p. 209
50
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol9/iss2/1
2002] DRUG TESTING OF INTERSCHOLASTIC ATHLETES
and the right most valued by civilized men."254 Thus, the bounda-
ries for drug-testing of the nation's students remains inconclusive -
all emanating from the premise that interscholastic athletes are role
models.
254. Id. at 478.
259
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